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This dissertation investigates several business cycle relationships when
economic agents are heterogeneous. The particular focus is on the interactions
between the cross-section of agents and the aggregate state of the economy.
The first chapter shows that, when occasionally binding capacity con-
straints limit the production of heterogeneous firms, demand shocks can endoge-
nously generate a number of important business cycle regularities: recessions
are deeper than booms are high, firm-level volatility is countercyclical, the ag-
gregate Solow residual is procyclical and the fiscal multiplier is countercyclical.
A baseline calibration of a basic New Keynesian DSGE model with capacity
constraints shows that this mechanism can explain more than a quarter of the
empirically observed asymmetry in output, and matches the cyclicality of firm-
level profitability dispersion and of the measured Solow residual. The model
implies fluctuations in the fiscal multiplier of around 0.12 between expansions
and recessions.
vi
Chapter two takes a different approach to firm level uncertainty, explor-
ing how recessions can cause an endogenous rise in firm risk. If heterogeneous
firms face real and financial frictions, then a shock to the mean of aggregate
productivity endogenously leads to countercyclical profitability risk through
firms’ heterogeneous responses in price setting. Additionally, the mechanism
endogenously generates countercyclical credit spreads and credit spread dis-
persion. The model explains a large share of the observed fluctuations in
profitability dispersion (69%) and in credit spreads (40%) through fluctua-
tions in aggregate TFP holding productivity risk constant. This suggests that
the scope for uncertainty shocks to explain recessions may be smaller than
previously thought.
The third chapter focuses on distributional effects of oil price shocks on
the household side. In the model, household behavior replicates two patterns
found in household-level data which show that gas consumption increases
with income, but on the intensive margin gasoline consumption as a share
of the household’s budget decreases with income. The model includes gas
consumption in household utility on top of a fixed minimum level of gas
consumption. Calibrated simulations suggest that a shock to the gas price is
almost twice as costly for relatively poor households than for relatively rich
households.
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Chapter 1
Capacity Constraints under Demand Shocks:
Business Cycle Implications (w. Chacko
George)
1.1 Introduction
This paper studies how to reconcile within a simple framework four
disparate business cycle facts: the asymmetry of business cycle fluctuations,
the countercyclicality of productivity dispersion across firms, the acyclicality
of utilization-adjusted total factor productivity, and counter-cyclical fiscal
multipliers. Together, these empirical findings characterize recessions as times
when output is especially low, volatility is high, and fiscal policy is particularly
effective.
While previous work has considered mechanisms that can account for
each fact in isolation, these potential explanations are generally at odds with
other facts. For example, one can appeal to asymmetric business cycle shocks
to explain the asymmetry in business cycles, but this would not, by itself,
account for the observed countercyclicality in the dispersion of cross-sectional
firm productivity. Rather than trying to combine all of the mechanisms that
could potentially account for each fact individually into an unwieldy model,
we instead show that a single mechanism —occasionally binding capacity
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constraints— can endogenously generate each of these business cycle facts
when introduced into an otherwise standard business cycle model.
In the model, firms choose their capital capacity before the realization
of idiosyncratic and aggregate demand shocks. After learning about these, they
may vary their utilization of capital in a way that is increasingly costly as the
utilization rate increases. When the economy experiences positive shocks to the
demand for firms’ products, they increase their capital utilization and output.
With capital predetermined, this endogenous choice of utilization gives rise to
procyclical measured total factor productivity even when business cycles are
driven by shocks other than TFP. At the same time utilization-adjusted factor
productivity may remain acyclical, as documented by Basu et al. (2006).
The combination of predetermined capital and convex utilization costs
yields an upper bound to any individual firm’s production. Large, positive
aggregate shocks, then, increase the number of firms at their capacity constraint.
This adds extra concavity to aggregate production as a function of demand
and helps explain the three remaining business cycle facts. First, booms are
“smaller” than downturns, in the sense that average deviations of output from
trend are smaller in absolute value when the economy is far above trend than
far below trend. In the calibrated model, capacity constraints generate around
one quarter of the observed asymmetry of U.S. business cycles.
Second, capacity constraints provide a channel through which fiscal
multipliers can be countercyclical. Higher government spending that increases
demand for firms products will have larger effects when the economy is in a
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downturn than in an expansion. During downturns, few firms are capacity
constrained and they can therefore readily expand production. In contrast, in
booms more firms are already producing at their capacity constraint which
reduces the expansionary effects of fiscal policy. While the extent of counter-
cyclicality of fiscal multipliers remains a point of contention empirically, the
model here suggests a difference in multipliers of about 0.12.
Third, idiosyncratic demand shocks generate a non-trivial distribution
in the measured productivity of firms. The share of firms at their capacity
constraint affects the variance of this distribution: Since all constrained firms
look very similar in terms of their productivity, a higher share of constrained
firms implies a lower variance in the distribution of productivity. Recessions,
during which few firms are capacity constrained, are then periods of high cross-
sectional productivity dispersion. Occasionally binding capacity constraints
therefore provide a previously unexplored channel through which cross-sectional
productivity dispersion can endogenously move in a countercyclical manner even
in the absence of second-moment shocks. Additionally, the model predicts that
this movement is concentrated in the left tail of the distribution, corresponding
to empirical findings in Kehrig (2013).
Understanding the properties of recessions matters in the assessment of
their welfare costs. For example, while symmetric fluctuations reduce welfare,
this loss is more severe if fluctuations exhibit asymmetry and the cost of a
downturn is hence concentrated in a short period of time. Increased volatility
in recessions can similarly reduce the welfare of risk-averse agents, and, as
3
recent literature has shown, can have adverse economic effects of its own. The
question of how economic fluctuations originate and are transmitted also has
important implications for fiscal policy because the efficacy of government
spending in general depends heavily on the cause of downturns. For example,
the government multiplier is generally acyclical in standard models, whereas
in models of uncertainty shocks, government spending can actually be less
effective in recessions than in normal times.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that capacity constraints
can explain several important features of the behavior of output under few
additional assumptions. Second, while the traditional Keynesian literature has
long emphasized idle capacities as one likely source of high fiscal multipliers
when aggregate demand is low, there has been relatively little work on integrat-
ing this mechanism into modern DSGE models. This paper provides such a
model. Third, we document how much the channel of capacity constraints, in
addition to being qualitatively consistent, can contribute quantitatively to the
explanation of the four business cycle facts. Finally, we add some evidence to
previous work on output asymmetry and find that large recessions on average
deviate 30% more from trend output than large booms.
A number of papers study the effects of variable capacity utilization
in general equilibrium frameworks. Work by Fagnart et al. (1999), Gilchrist
and Williams (2000), A´lvarez Lois (2006) and Hansen and Prescott (2005)
investigates capacity constraints with heterogeneous firms. The main difference
to the present paper is that they consider shocks to aggregate TFP under
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putty-clay technology or irreversibilities, whereas we focus on fluctuations in
aggregate demand under standard Cobb-Douglas production in which capacity
constraints arise endogenously rather than as an assumption on production
technology. The closest models are Fagnart et al. (1999) and A´lvarez Lois
(2006), who explicitly model the pricing decision of monopolistically competitive
firms. Fagnart et al. (1999) focus on the amplification of TFP shocks under
putty-clay technology and flexible prices, whereas A´lvarez Lois (2006) looks
at the response of firm mark-ups when prices are set one period in advance
as well as the internal propagation of the putty-clay mechanism. Gilchrist
and Williams (2000) emphasize the asymmetric effects on output following
large TFP shocks and the hump-shaped response that is generated through the
effects of vintage capital. Hansen and Prescott (2005) generate asymmetries
by including a choice along the extensive margin of operating or idling plants.
A strand of papers considers variable capacity utilization in a repre-
sentative-agent framework (Greenwood et al. (1988), Cooley et al. (1995),
Bils and Cho (1994), Christiano et al. (2005)). In contrast, the environment
with heterogeneous firms allows us to consider occasionally binding capacity
constraints, as well as price setting and demand shocks in the monopolistic
competition framework. This firm heterogeneity in turn is driving several of
the results in our model, as we show in section 1.5.
A recent paper that also looks at the interplay of cross-sectional and
aggregate asymmetries is Ilut et al. (2014), albeit under a different mechanism.
They show that under ambiguity aversion (or more generally any concave
5
reaction of employment growth to expected profitability), news shocks can
tightly link countercyclical volatility at the micro and macro level. Their
explanation involving firms’ decision making offers a complementary alternative
to the approach in this paper focusing on firms’ production technology.
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section 1.2 we review the
stylized facts established by recent literature. In section 1.3 we illustrate in a
stylized example how capacity constraints can generate these facts qualitatively.
We embed this mechanism in a full DSGE model in section 1.4, and discuss
quantitative results in section 1.5. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Four business cycle regularities
In the following we review the evidence for the four business cycle facts
(asymmetry in output, countercyclical profitability dispersion, strong depen-
dence of the Solow residual’s cyclicality on factor utilization, a countercyclical
fiscal multiplier) that previous literature has found. Since business cycles can
be “asymmetric” in many ways, we discuss the specific type of asymmetry we
are interested in and then provide new evidence from US output series.
Large deviations in output from trend are likely negative The ques-
tion of whether business cycles are asymmetric is fairly old. However, as
noted by McKay and Reis (2008), it is also too broad to answer — there are
many different ways in which business cycle asymmetry could theoretically
manifest itself. As they emphasize, one should therefore be specific in exactly
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which way one wants to assess asymmetries. Previous literature can be loosely
grouped into four ways to research this question: By looking for asymmetry in
1) output growth 2) output levels 3) employment growth 4) employment levels.
It is worth recalling that asymmetry in levels and growth rates need not be
associated. As discussed for example in Sichel (1993), a time series exhibits
asymmetry in levels if, say, troughs are far below trend but peaks are relatively
flat. Asymmetry in growth rates would be characterized by, say, sudden drops
and slow recoveries. Correspondingly, these two types of asymmetry have been
dubbed “deepness” and “steepness”, respectively, in the literature.
Our reading of the literature is that there is no strong evidence for asym-
metry in output growth rates which most papers have focused on (e.g. DeLong
and Summers (1986), Bai and Ng (2005), McKay and Reis (2008)). As docu-
mented by Sichel (1993), there is some evidence for skewness in output levels.
Employment tends to behave more skewed than output over the cycle: Prior
work has found asymmetry in both employment growth and in employment
levels (e.g. Ilut et al. (2014), McKay and Reis (2008)).
The focus of this paper is on the claim that large deviations of output
from trend are more likely to be negative than positive. This means we are
interested in the behavior of output levels, for which there is some evidence of
asymmetry (Sichel (1993)).
In Table 1.1 we report a number of additional observations about the
relative magnitude of “strong” booms and recessions. Specifically, we use a
detrended output series to construct three measures of differences in large
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output deviations. For the first measure, we pick an integer N and compare
the N/2 largest (i.e. positive) deviations with the N/2 smallest (i.e. negative)
deviations by comparing their means. Here, if business cycles are asymmetric
in levels, we would expect the mean deviation in strong recessions to be larger
than the mean deviation in strong expansions. Second, in the next column we
count how many of the N periods with the largest absolute deviations from
trend were positive versus negative. If output is asymmetric as defined above,
we would expect the number of periods with negative output deviations to be
larger. As a third measure we report the overall skewness of the series (using
all periods), defined as the sample estimate of E [(x− µ)3/σ3]. This is a less
direct measure of only large output deviations, but all else equal we would
expect the coefficient of skewness to be negative.
We construct these measures for a range of specifications in which we
vary the time-series representing “output”, the length of the series, the trend
filter, as well as the number N of extreme periods considered. The baseline
specification uses HP-filtered postwar data. HP filtering often constitutes the
weakest case in terms of differences between expansions and recessions since
at the edges of the sample this detrending method tends to attribute parts of
the cyclical movement into the trend. For almost all specifications in Table 1.1
we see that large deviations from trend are more likely to be negative.1 On
average across all specifications, recessions appear around 30% deeper than
1In fact the only specification in which negative output deviations are not larger than
positive deviations is for annual GDP when we start the series in 1929 and use an HP filter
which, at the beginning of the sample, picks up the Great Depression as part of the trend.
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booms are high.
In section 1.5 we calibrate our model to an HP-1600-filtered quarterly
US GDP series, corresponding to the quarterly baseline specification in Table
1.1. The model will yield trend deviations of 3.24% in an expansion and −3.45%
in a recession and thus covers a little more than a quarter of the observed
asymmetry under the baseline specification.
Cross-sectional measures of firm productivity are countercyclical
The second fact is connected to a range of findings in the literature that
associate recessions with increased cross-sectional dispersion among firms along
several dimensions. Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) show that capital produc-
tivity is more dispersed in recessions. Bloom (2009) and Bloom et al. (2012)
include empirical evidence associating times of low aggregate production to
higher dispersion in sales growth, innovations to plant profitability, and sectoral
output. Directly related to levels of firm productivity, Kehrig (2013) finds
that the distribution of plant revenue productivity becomes wider in recessions;
Bachmann and Bayer (2013b) reach a similar result for innovations to the
Solow residual in a dataset of German firms. Kehrig (2013) notes that it is
mainly the bottom tail of the distribution that moves over the cycle. This
variation in the cross-sectional skewness of profitability will be replicated in
our model where the firms at the top of the distribution, which are near their
capacity, all look very similar in terms of their profitability.
Broadly, there have been two, not mutually exclusive, approaches to
9
Table 1.1: Strong recessions larger than strong expansions
Specification Mean pos vs neg # pos vs neg Skewness
Quarterly GDP
Baseline 2.73% vs −3.43% 16 vs 24 −0.46
N = 20 3.12% vs −4.33% 6 vs 14 −0.46
N = 80 2.28% vs −2.87% 40 vs 40 −0.46
Until 2007 2.71% vs −3.36% 18 vs 22 −0.46
Linear filter 7.99% vs −12.70% 6 vs 34 −0.81
Rotemberg filter 4.19% vs −5.68% 6 vs 34 −0.33
Rot. filter, N = 80 3.74% vs −5.14% 29 vs 51 −0.33
Annual GDP
Baseline 3.20% vs −4.40% 3 vs 7 −0.35
N = 6 3.37% vs −4.83% 0 vs 6 −0.35
N = 20 2.99% vs −3.55% 13 vs 7 −0.35
Until 2007 3.20% vs −4.41% 4 vs 6 −0.35
From 1929 16.69% vs −11.61% 6 vs 4 +1.00
Linear filter 7.29% vs −12.51% 2 vs 8 −0.88
Linear filter from 1929 20.50% vs −31.08% 3 vs 7 −0.91
Rotemberg filter 6.23% vs −13.50% 1 vs 9 −0.87
Rot. filter from 1929 16.15% vs −36.95% 1 vs 9 −1.22
Monthly industrial production
Baseline 4.52% vs −5.90% 50 vs 70 −0.65
N = 40 5.48% vs −7.57% 7 vs 33 −0.65
N = 240 3.71% vs −4.45% 124 vs 116 −0.65
Until 2007 4.39% vs −5.58% 56 vs 64 −0.65
From 1919 11.35% vs −13.59% 54 vs 66 −0.55
Linear filter 17.03% vs −22.69% 33 vs 87 −0.52
Rotemberg filter 7.47% vs −11.23% 46 vs 74 −0.62
Notes: “Mean pos vs neg”: Mean of the N/2 largest periods vs mean of the N/2 smallest periods.
“# pos vs neg”: Out of the N periods with largest absolute value, how many were positive and
how many were negative. “Skewness”: Coefficient of skewness defined as E
[
(x− µ)3/σ3].
For all three series in the baseline, N corresponds to a little less than 1/6 of observations, series
were HP filtered and starting date is January 1949. “Quarterly GDP”: N = 40, end date 2014:4,
HP(1600)-filtered. “Annual GDP”: N = 10, end date 2013, HP(100)-filtered. “Monthly industrial
production”: N = 120, end date 2014/02, HP(10, 000)-filtered. Alternative specifications differ
from respective baseline only along listed dimensions.
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explain the negative correlation of profitability risk with output. One fruitful
strand of literature starting with Bloom (2009) investigates the causal effect
of exogenous increases in aggregate, cross-sectional, or policy uncertainty on
economic conditions. A different set of papers has considered the opposite
direction of causality, studying under which conditions a bad aggregate state
can cause firm-level dispersion to increase endogenously; examples include
Bachmann and Sims (2012), Decker et al. (2014), and Kuhn (2014).
The simple Solow residual is procyclical, but much less so if corrected
for factor utilization For this stylized fact we draw on Basu et al. (2006)
who discuss ways to improve the measurement of aggregate productivity. In
particular, they construct a measure for aggregate technology that accounts for
potentially confounding influences of returns to scale, imperfect competition,
aggregation across sectors and (especially relevant here), utilization rates of
factor inputs. Their uncorrected productivity measure, the Solow residual, is
strongly procyclical: Correlation between output growth and simple TFP is 0.74.
The corrected measure does not exhibit this strong association with aggregate
production, as the correlation of purified TFP with (contemporaneous) output
growth is 0.02. Figure 1.1 visualizes Basu et al. (2006)’s results.
Since the mechanism considered in this paper hinges strongly on the
effect of adjustment in factor input utilization, we recalculate the above corre-
lation coefficients using data provided by John Fernald2 (see Fernald (2012))
2Data available at www.frbsf.org/economic-research/economists/jfernald/quarterly tfp.xls
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Figure 1.1: GDP and TFP measures from Basu et al. (2006)
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Notes: Annual series for growth rates of GDP (blue solid line), simple TFP as measured by
the Solow residual (red dash-dotted line), and purified TFP as constructed by Basu et al.
(2006) (green dashed line). Data from Basu et al. (2006). Correlation between output growth
and simple TFP growth is 0.74, correlation between output growth and purified TFP growth
is 0.02.
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which corrects only for intensity of capital and labor utilization. This allows
us to check if utilization is indeed responsible for the difference in cyclicality
between the simple and the purified productivity measure (or if instead the
difference stems mainly from the other ‘purifying’ steps taken by Basu et al.
(2006)). Additionally, this dataset spans 15 more years at the end of the sample
and is at a quarterly frequency. Again, simple TFP is strongly procyclical
with a correlation of 0.83 whereas utilization-corrected TFP has a coefficient
of −0.03.
Our takeaway from this finding is that not correcting for factor input
utilization strongly increases the relationship between measured aggregate
productivity and output. While we do not want to weigh in on the question of
which type of shocks drive business cycles, we focus on demand shocks in order
to take the extreme stance of constant physical productivity. This allows us to
assess how much cyclicality in measured TFP can be generated even when the
model’s correlation of output with physical TFP is 0.
As suggested by Wen (2004) and Basu et al. (2006), demand shocks
under variable capacity utilization are a possible explanation of this fact.
Alternatively, Bai et al. (2012) provide an example of a search model in which
demand shocks can show up as productivity shocks when search effort is a
variable margin.
The government spending multiplier is countercyclical The cause of
asymmetries in the business cycle in our model is directly relevant for the
13
effectiveness of policy. Our contribution about capacity constraints and business
cycle asymmetries thus complements the literature on cyclical fiscal multipliers.
Empirically estimating the level and cyclicality of the government multiplier is
difficult because of severe endogeneity issues. Nevertheless, recent estimates
have found significant cyclicality in fiscal multipliers, although the exact size
of fluctuations is not identified very precisely. On one end of the spectrum,
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) estimate the fiscal multiplier in a regime-
switching model and find large swings over the cycle ranging from around 0
during a typical boom to around 1.5 during a typical recession, albeit with large
confidence intervals. Other papers identifying the multiplier in structural VARs
are Mittnik and Semmler (2012) and Bachmann and Sims (2012) who also
find significant cyclicality. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011), Ilzetzki et al.
(2013) and Corsetti et al. (2012) all find evidence for state-dependence of the
fiscal multiplier in cross-country comparisons. Nakamura and Steinsson (2014)
use regional variation in the US to identify a positive relationship between the
local spending multiplier and the unemployment rate. Ramey and Zubairy
(2014) find that the estimated magnitude of multiplier fluctuations over the
cycle is sensitive to the exact specification of the employed empirical model.
Not too much is known about the particular transmission channel
through which aggregate conditions affect the multiplier. As Sims and Wolff
(2014) point out, several papers model the difference between government
spending when interest rates are at the zero lower bound and spending during
normal times. Historically however, episodes at the zero lower bound have been
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relatively rare; and the empirical estimates go beyond these times indicating that
the fiscal multiplier also fluctuates with the business cycle when interest rates
are positive. Sims and Wolff (2014) explicitly consider multiplier fluctuations
over the business cycle in a medium-scale RBC model. Their mechanism is
based on households’ higher willingness to supply additional labor in recessions.
The model by Michaillat (2014) generates a labor multiplier, in which a search
friction causes overall employment to respond stronger to government hiring
in recessions than in booms. Here, we focus on the effect of underutilized
capacity which complements mechanisms in these papers. Our calibrated model
implies average fluctuations of the fiscal multiplier of around 0.12, with the
fiscal multiplier increasing with the size of recessions.
1.3 Numerical Illustration
We now illustrate the aggregate effects of capacity constraints in a
framework of heterogeneous firms by looking at a stylized example. Firms
choose their capacity before their random demand is realized. A given capacity
is associated with an upper bound to production, so that if a firm’s demand
is greater than this bound, that firm will be constrained and produce just at
capacity.
Formally, there is a continuum of ex-ante identical firms indexed by
i ∈ [0, 1]. Each firm can rent capital (or “capacity”) ki at a real rental price of
R at the beginning of the period. A firm’s production yi is a function of utilized
capital k˜i, which for simplicity is specified as linear. Capital utilization is free
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here, however it is subject to the constraint that utilized capital is less than
capacity yi = k˜i s.t. k˜i ≤ ki. Finally, a firm faces random demand bi which is
distributed according to a cumulative distribution function F (b).
A firm’s sales after realization of bi will then be yi = min {bi, ki}. The
firm uses this fact when deciding on the amount of capacity to rent in order to
maximize expected profits. The problem can be written as
max
k
−Rk +
∫ k
0
b df(b) + [1− F (k)] k.
The resulting choice for ki (if interior) requires 1− F (ki) = R, such that for
any firm there is a chance of 1−R that the capacity constraint binds. Denote
the cutoff value for bi at which the firm just produces at capacity as b¯i = ki.
Since all firms face the same problem, they choose the same ki = k and
of course have the same cutoff b¯ = k. The demand shocks bi then induce a
distribution over yi with a point mass 1− F (b¯) at mass point b¯.
We can now look at what happens in response to aggregate fluctuations
modeled as unexpected shifts in the mean of the distribution F (b). To see the
effects in this example, consider the case of a uniform(0, 1) distribution over b,
such that the optimally chosen capacity is k = 1−R.
Output fluctuations and fiscal multiplier: Aggregate output in this
case is Y =
∫ 1−R
0
b db + R(1 − R) = 1
2
(1 − R2). Now there is an unexpected
fluctuation in the mean by , and b is now distributed uniform (, 1 + ). But
then aggregate production is Y = 1
2
(1−R2) + (1−R)− 1
2
2. This exemplifies
the second-order nature of output fluctuations: for small values of , positive
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and negative output changes are about the same size, while a large positive 
has a smaller output effects than a large negative one due to the increasing
importance of the quadratic term.
Similarly we can look at the effect of a marginal increase in . This
could represent government policy that unexpectedly increases demand by just
a little and so is a measure of the (marginal) fiscal multiplier. With the second
derivative d2Y/d2 = − an additional small increase in aggregate demand
affects output less, the higher aggregate demand already is.
The government multiplier and the asymmetry in output are therefore
closely related. They are not quite measuring the same thing however. The
difference between a large boom and recession is given by the average effect
of an increase in demand (that is, the difference in output between aggregate
states), while the multiplier is determined by the marginal effect (that is, the
effect of a small demand shock on output at different aggregate states).
Figure 1.2 displays the mapping from demand shocks bi into output yi
for an interest rate of 0.3 such that the implied capacity constraint is at 0.7.
The three sets of points represent the case without aggregate shock ( = 0) as
well as aggregate shocks of  = ±0.1.
Profitability dispersion: The example illustrates that while aggregates
are asymmetric, the cycle affects differences between firms as well. An individual
firm’s profitability can be measured as yi/ki = yi/(1 − R). Since the factor
input cost R is the same for all firms this means that the relative cross-sectional
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of yi in numerical illustration
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Notes: The figure plots simulated output levels yi (X-axis) for a sample of 100 firms depending
on their respective realized demand bi (Y-axis). Blue •: no aggregate shock, firm output
uniformly distributed between 0 and 0.7, and a mass point at 0.7. Green +: For a positive
demand shock  = 0.1, additional firms get pushed into their capacity constraint. Output
expands less than proportionally, dispersion in output (and profitability) decreases, aggregate
capacity utilization and Solow residual increase. Red ∗: The opposite is true for a negative
demand shock  = −0.1. The left tail of the distribution becomes wider and the mass of
firms at capacity decreases.
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variance in profitability at any point is equal to the relative variance in output.
While the analytic expression for Var(yi) as a function of  is somewhat involved,
the intuition is straightforward: the greater the mass of firms at the capacity
constraint, the smaller the variance in profitability of the overall distribution.
In the extreme case of a very large negative shock (corresponding to  < −0.3
in the example), no firm would be at the constraint and thus dispersion would
be greatest. This mechanism is consistent with the data: Kehrig (2013) finds
that it is predominantly movement in the left tail that drives changes in firms’
profitability distribution.
Measured aggregate productivity: Simple measured aggregate TFP is
Y/K = 1
2
(1+R)+− 1
2
2/(1−R), hence it increases with  due to more intensive
use of installed capacity. Measured aggregate TFP is hence endogenously
procyclical while TFP corrected for utilization is trivially given by Y/K˜ = 1
by definition of the production function.
This example illustrates how capacity constraints can qualitatively gen-
erate deep recessions along with meek booms, countercyclical fiscal multipliers
and a more dispersed productivity distribution in recessions. All of these
features come from a simple shock structure that is perfectly symmetric over
time and across firms.
1.4 Model
We now embed capacity constraints in a New-Keynesian model of
aggregate demand shocks to look at the effects in general equilibrium. While
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the intuition from the previous section about their qualitative implications fully
carries through, only a general-equilibrium model will be able to inform us
about the size of asymmetries generated by capacity constraints quantitatively.
The main difference relative to the example in the previous section is
that the capacity constraint now arises endogenously due to convex capital
utilization costs. Such convex utilization costs can easily be justified by
empirically relevant features such as overtime pay or increased depreciation.
In particular, a firm’s maximal production is given by its willingness to supply
goods rather than an assumed technological constraint. For this, in the model
firms not only choose their capacity, but also their goods price at the beginning
of the period before any shocks are realized. Labor constitutes a second flexible
factor of production in addition to utilized capital, and an individual firm’s
demand now comes from a standard final goods aggregator. Finally, there is a
central bank setting nominal interest rates.
There are several reasons why we model firms as setting their price
in advance. First, it keeps the model tractable since all firms face the same
environment at the time of their decision and hence choose the same price.
Second, it will allow us to endogenize capacity constraints as the quantity firms
are willing to supply at the set prices. Third, in this context it provides a
convenient way of introducing price rigidities which allow preference shocks to
affect output through changes in relative prices, as is usual in New Keynesian
models.3
3Kuhn (2014) shows that in general it is important to model firms’ pricing behavior
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In order for firm supply to constitute an upper bound to production we
will specify that, when supply and demand do not coincide at the set price,
quantity traded is given by the minimum of supply and demand, and hence
determined by the ‘short’ market side. This rule differs in particular from an
alternative in which the price setter is required to satisfy the other market
side’s demand or supply at the given price. Fagnart et al. (1999) use a similar
setup and discuss the implications for planned and traded quantities in more
detail.
1.4.1 Timing
The timing within a period is as follows:
1. Households enter a period t with an amount of aggregate capital Kt. At
the beginning of the period, before any shocks are realized, a capacity
rental market opens where households supply Kt and firms rent their
capacity for this period, kit. Simultaneously, firms choose their price pit.
(Later in equilibrium, because all firms are the same at the beginning of
the period, kit = Kt and pit = pt.)
2. All idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks are realized.
3. The remaining markets open: Firms make their decisions about labor
demand and capacity utilization; households decide on their labor supply
explicitly when considering cross-sectional profitability measures: Differences in pricing can
prevent firms’ profitability from tracking their physical productivity, as highlighted by Foster
et al. (2008).
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and desired savings in capital and bonds. Households also receive firm
profits and pay taxes. The monetary authority sets the nominal interest
rate as a function of inflation. The period ends.
1.4.2 Final goods aggregator
The final good Y is assembled from a continuum of varieties indexed by
i ∈ [0, 1] according to a standard CES function with parameter σ measuring
the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods
Y =
(∫
b
1
σ
i y
σ−1
σ
i di
) σ
σ−1
.
The weights {bi} are realizations of iid random variables with mean 1.
The perfectly competitive final goods aggregator takes intermediate
goods prices as given. It has a nominal budget of I ≥ ∫ piyi di, where pi is an
intermediate variety’s nominal price. The aggregator also takes into account
the capacity constraint that limits the supply of some varieties. Denoting
this upper limit4 by y¯, it therefore has to consider a continuum of inequality
constraints yi ≤ y¯ ∀i. The problem can then be expressed as
max
{yi},λ,{µi}
(∫
b
1
σ
i y
σ−1
σ
i di
) σ
σ−1
+ λ
(
I −
∫
piyi di
)
+
∫
µi (y¯ − yi) di.
After taking first-order conditions (see appendix 1.1), one has
ydi = bi
IUP
σ−1
U
pσi
4In equilibrium the upper bound y¯ is going to be equal to the intermediates’ maximum
supply dictated by costly capacity utilization ys and indeed the same for all firms. One could
solve the aggregator’s problem more generally using a variety-specific y¯i at the cost of more
notation, but considering a y¯ constant across varieties is enough here.
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with IU ≡
∫
yi<y¯
piyi di the budget spent on unconstrained varieties and P
1−σ
U ≡∫
yi<y¯
p1−σi di a price index over unconstrained varieties.
5
1.4.3 Firms
As in the simple example, we are going to solve the firm’s problem
backwards: We first determine a firm’s optimal utilization and labor input
given its realization of bi and chosen capacity and price, and then the optimal
k and p choices that maximize expected profits.
Technology The intermediate goods firms’ production function is y = k˜αl1−α,
where l is the hired labor input.6 There is a quadratic real cost of utilizing
capital which depends on the utilization rate k˜/k and total capacity k given by
cu
(
k˜
k
, k
)
=
χ
2
(
k˜
k
)2
k.
This formulation ensures that the utilization costs scale linearly with k and
hence the optimal utilization rate is going to be independent of firm size. There
is also a quadratic real cost of adjusting the nominal price p which depends on
the relative change p/p−1 through
C
(
p
p−1
)
=
ξ
2
(
p
pt−1
− 1
)2
.
5As noted by Fagnart et al. (1999) the demand function for the constrained varieties is
undefined, and yd denotes demand for the unconstrained varieties.
6In this section the firm index i is suppressed to save notation. It will reappear in the
section on aggregation below.
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We employ this cost because it is the simplest possible way of introducing
nominal rigidities — its tractability in the context of this model stems from
the fact that all firms choose the same price in equilibrium. Additionally, the
price adjustment cost adds an intertemporal dimension to the firm’s problem
and thus generates some internal propagation of shocks (if ξ = 0 the firm’s
problem is reduced to an infinite sequence of one-shot problems).
Cost function The cost function describes the cheapest way for a firm to
produce a fixed output level y given the marginal cost of the input factors
which are in turn determined by the level of capacity k and the real wage w.
It is given by
C (y) = min
k˜,l
wl +
χ
2
(
k˜
k
)2
k
s.t. k˜αl1−α ≥ y.
The first-order conditions give optimal input factor quantities as
k˜ =
(
α
1− α
w
χ
k
) 1−α
α+2(1−α)
y
1
α+2(1−α) (1.1)
l =
(
1− α
α
χ
w
k−1
) α
α+2(1−α)
y
ψ
α+2(1−α) (1.2)
such that the cost function is
C (y) =
α + 2 (1− α)
2α
[
χα
(
α
1− αw
)2(1−α)
y2k−α
] 1
α+2(1−α)
.
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Supply function and cutoff b The firm considers the level of output ys that
maximizes profits given its price and cost function, but ignoring the demand
curve. In other words, the firm thinks about how much it would produce if
there was infinite demand for its variety. With P denoting the nominal price
of the final good, it considers its maximal operating profits
max
y
p
P y − C (y)
which is solved by
ys =
(
α
χ
)(
1− α
w
) 2(1−α)
α ( p
P
)α+2(1−α)
α
k. (1.3)
The convexity of the capital utilization cost function ensures that supply given
w, p/P and k is finite.
As mentioned above, there are no contractual arrangements that would
require firms to produce more than they desire, so that actual quantity traded
is given by
y = min
{
yd, ys
}
. (1.4)
This defines a cutoff value b¯ for the idiosyncratic demand shock at which
ys = yd as
b¯
IUP
σ−1
U
pσ
≡
(
α
χ
)(
1− α
w
) 2(1−α)
α ( p
P
)α+2(1−α)
α
k.
Any firm with b > b¯ will be constrained due to costly utilization, while firms
with b < b¯ just satisfy demand. An algebraically useful implication is that yd
can be written as
yd = (b/b¯)ys. (1.5)
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Operating profits, expected profits, and value function Depending
on realized demand b, operating profits as a function of p and k are given by
pi(p, k, b) =
{
p
P y
d(p, b)− C (yd(p, b); k) if b ≤ b¯
p
P y
s(p, k)− C (ys(p, k)) = pP ys(p, k)α2 if b > b¯
At the beginning of the period the firm can compute expected profits
by integrating over b:
E [pi(p, k, b)] =
∫ b¯
0
p
P y
d(p, b)− C (yd(p, b); k) df(b) +∫ ∞
b¯
p
P y
s(p, k)
α
2
df(b).
The firm can now choose its price and capacity at the beginning of the
period in order to maximize expected operating profits minus the rental cost of
capacity and the (expected discounted sum of future) costs of price adjustment.
In fact, only the price adjustment cost makes the firm problem truly dynamic.
The problem is summarized in the firm’s value function
V (p−1) = max
p,k
E [pi (p, k)]−[R− (1− δ)] k−ξ
2
(
p
p−1
− 1
)2
+βE [V (p)] . (1.6)
1.4.4 Households
There is a price-taking representative household. She maximizes lifetime
utility given by
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
logCt − ϕt L
1+ε
t
1 + ε
)]
where Ct is consumption and Lt is hours worked in period t. There is a random
weight ϕt shifting the relative preference of consumption and leisure and which
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will serve as an aggregate demand shock. This formulation of preferences is
consistent with existence of a balanced growth path. Separability between
consumption and leisure precludes the concavity in the household’s labor supply
function that drives the results in Sims and Wolff (2014) which helps us isolate
the effects of variable capacity utilization on the firm side.
Besides working, the household also earns income from renting capital
Kt to firms as well as from holding one-period bonds issued by the central
bank. Her real bond demand in t is denoted with St, and central bank pays
a nominal interest rate of Rt on these bonds. The household also collects all
profits from firms pit ≡
∫
piit− [R− (1− δ)] kit− ξ2
(
pit
pi,t−1
− 1
)2
di and finances
any government spending with a lump-sum transfer of Gt. Combining all these
payments in units of final goods yields her real flow budget constraint
Ct + St +Kt+1 =
Rt−1
Πt
St−1 +Rt−1Kt + wtLt + pit −Gt.
The variable Πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 denotes inflation.
Her optimality conditions are the labor supply equation
wt = ϕtL
ε
tCt, (1.7)
the Euler equation
1
Ct
= βRtE
[
1
Ct+1Πt+1
]
, (1.8)
as well as a no-arbitrage condition between nominal assets and capital
RtE
[
1
Ct+1Πt+1
]
= E
[
Rt
Ct+1
]
. (1.9)
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1.4.5 Central bank and government
The central bank sets nominal interest rates in accordance with a simple
Taylor rule such that inflation fluctuates around its long-run mean of zero:
log (Rt) = log (1/β) + CBrf log (Πt) . (1.10)
The parameter CBrf determines how strongly the central bank reacts to
inflation.
A government undertaking fiscal policy is the second part in the public
sector, and also kept very simple. It can buy goods Gt from the final goods
firm which it then consumes. It runs a balanced budget and collects lump-sum
taxes Gt from the household. We do not explicitly model a (stochastic) process
for government spending. Instead, we fix Gt = 0 unless we are specifically
interested in the effects
1.4.6 Aggregation and equilibrium
Firms use their first-order necessary conditions from maximization
of their value (1.6) to determine optimal price and capacity (pit, kit) at the
beginning of the period. Since, before realization of period t shocks, all firms
share the same state variables, they choose identical prices and capacities
such that pit = pt and kit = kt ∀i. Additionally, firms’ decisions about
utilization and labor in (1.1) - (1.2) and quantity traded in (1.4) are monomial
in min
{
bi/b¯, 1
}
. This makes integration over i straightforward and gives
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aggregate capital utilization costs and labor demand as
CU =
α
2
p
P y
s
(∫ b¯
0
(
b
b¯
) 2
2−α
df (b) +
[
1− F (b¯)]) (1.11)
Ld =
1− α
w
p
P y
s
(∫ b¯
0
(
b
b¯
) 2
2−α
df (b) +
[
1− F (b¯)]) (1.12)
and final goods supply using the aggregator’s production function as
Y = b¯
1
σ−1ys
{[∫ b¯
0
b
b¯
df (b) +
∫ ∞
b¯
(
b
b¯
) 1
σ
df (b)
]} σ
σ−1
. (1.13)
In equilibrium, the final goods price Pt as well as the producer price pt
are not determined in levels. These prices, however, only matter relative to each
other or their respective values from the previous period. We therefore define
the real price of intermediate goods as rpt = pt/Pt, inflation as Πt = Pt/Pt−1,
and producer price inflation as Πppit = pt/pt−1. These relative prices in turn
are related according to
Πppit = Πt
rpt
rpt−1
(1.14)
as can easily be derived from their definition.
Equilibrium then is defined in the usual way using agents’ optimality
conditions and clearing of aggregate markets. Notably, the clearing of ag-
gregate markets is unaffected by the fact that predetermined prices prevent
intermediate goods markets from clearing. Specifically, we define as equi-
librium a sequence of prices
{
Rt,Rt, wt, rpt,Πt,Πppit
}∞
t=0
, and of quantities{
Yt, Ct, CUt, L
d
t , y
s
t , kt, Kt, Lt
}∞
t=0
and cutoffs
{
b¯t
}∞
t=0
that satisfy the firms’ two
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optimality conditions derived from (1.6), their supply (1.3), aggregate fac-
tor demands and final goods supply (1.11)-(1.13), the household’s optimality
conditions (1.7)-(1.9), the Taylor rule (1.10), the definition of producer price
inflation (1.14), as well as market clearing for labor and capital, an aggregate
resource constraint, and the aggregator’s zero-profit condition. Note that for
this definition we have already imposed ys = y¯.
Appendix 1.2 collects these equilibrium conditions.
1.5 Calibration and results
1.5.1 Calibration
In the following we simulate the model and show that the qualitative
results from the example hold up in general equilibrium. Table 1.2 summarizes
the calibration of model parameters in two groups: The first group contains
parameters that have direct empirical interpretations, whereas the second group
consists of parameters that are specific to the model.
The first group of parameters is set to conventional values found in the
literature. Capital’s share of income α is set to 1/3, and capital depreciation is
δ = 2.6% implying an annual rate of 10%. Based on estimates of the average
mark-up between around 10% and 30% , the macroeconomic literature uses
values for the elasticity of substitution between goods σ between 4 as for
example in Bloom et al. (2012) and 10 as for example in Sims and Wolff (2014).
We hence choose an interior value of 6. Households have a discount factor of
β = 0.99 such that the annual steady-state interest rate is around 4%. The
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Table 1.2: Baseline Calibration
Parameter Value Meaning Calibration
Standard parameters
α 1
3
yi = k˜
α
i l
1−α
i Capital share
β 0.99 Hh discount factor Standard (quarterly)
δ 0.026 Capital depreciation Standard (quarterly)
ε 1
2
Inv. Frisch E. of labor Standard
σ 6 E. of S. intermediates Lit: σ ∈ [4, 10])
ρϕ 0.9 Shock persistence Standard (quarterly)
σϕ 0.004 Shock variance sd(Yt) = 1.8%
ξ 75 Scale price adj. cost Ireland (2001)
CBrf 1.75 Taylor rule Sims and Wolff (2014)
Model-specific parameters
χ 1 Scale utiliz. cost See text
σb 0.67 sd idiosync. shocks sd(∆TFPi) = 0.185
parameter ε set to 1/2 targets a Frisch elasticity of labor supply of 2 which is
also a standard value in macroeconomic models. The aggregate shock follows
an AR(1) process in logs such that log (ϕt) = ρϕ logϕt−1 + uϕ where uϕ is a
mean-zero normal random variable with variance σ2ϕ. We set the persistence
parameter ρϕ = 0.9. The standard deviation of innovations σϕ = 0.004 is
chosen to match the empirical standard deviation of quarterly postwar US
GDP of 1.8% when detrended with an HP(1600) filter. The price adjustment
cost parameter ξ is set to 75, corresponding to the estimate in Ireland (2001).
The coefficient measuring how the central bank reacts to inflation is set to 1.75
as in Sims and Wolff (2014).
The second group of parameters describes the utilization cost function
and the variance of idiosyncratic shocks. We assume the distribution of the
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iid idiosyncratic shock bi to be log-normal and set the parameter σb governing
its variance to match the variance of innovations to firm profitability in the
data. In particular, both Syverson (2011) and Ilut et al. (2014) find a standard
deviation of innovations to the log of firm TFP of around 0.185. We match this
to average growth rates in the firms’ measured TFP in the model. Unfortunately
we are unaware of direct empirical estimates for the parameter χ. Moreover,
varying the parameter over the admissible range for determinacy implied by
the Blanchard-Kahn conditions changes quantitative results only minimally –
the fact that the utilization cost parameter is not very well identified by the
model can also be observed in other papers, see for example Christiano et al.
(2005). We therefore set the parameter χ to unity.
A central feature of the model is that the fluctuating share of capacity
constrained firms generates extra concavity in aggregate production. This
causes effect sizes to increase with the magnitude of aggregate fluctuations.
For example, if aggregate shocks are small, the response of output to a positive
shock is similar to the response to a negative shock. Relative differences
between booms and recessions increase as the aggregate shock becomes larger.
Model results are therefore somewhat sensitive to the variance σ2ϕ of innovations
to ϕ. In the baseline calibration we take a conservative stance by detrending
the empirical GDP series with an HP-1600 filter, which implies a relatively
moderate standard deviation of 1.8% for its cyclical component. If, on the
other hand, the underlying growth trend of the empirical series were better
described by a linear trend, then the time-series standard deviation of the
32
cyclical component is 4.7%, which significantly amplifies output asymmetry
and the fiscal multiplier in our results. We consider this alternative calibration
in section 1.5.2.5.
1.5.2 Results
1.5.2.1 Impulse response functions
We simulate business cycles by a shock to the household’s preference
weight ϕ governing her relative taste for consumption and leisure. While we
acknowledge many other possible shocks that can cause aggregate fluctuations,
as discussed above we focus on this preference shock as a simple way to generate
demand-side effects through distorted relative prices, which in turn allows us to
assess how much movement in the measured Solow residual is generated even by
a non-technology shock. The model is solved with a second-order approximation
around the non-stochastic steady state using the software package Dynare (see
Adjemian et al. (2011)). An approximation of at least second order is necessary
here since we want to account for the non-linearities generating differences
between positive and negative shocks. Under linearization these differences
would be lost.
Figure 1.3 displays simulated impulse response functions following a
1-standard-deviation increase in the leisure preference of households ϕ. For
approximations of order higher than 1 the effect size of a shock will in general
depend on the state of the economy at the time of impact. The standard way
of computing impulse responses in such a case is through simulation, which
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approximates an ‘average’ effect of the shock across many simulated states.7
Most notable is the strong reaction to the shock on impact in period
1. With prices set one period in advance the usual “New Keynesian” effect
of demand shocks via relative prices is fully concentrated in period 1. What
remains of the shock in periods 2 and later is primarily driven by the supply
side effect of reduced household willingness to work and reduced capital stock
from period 1, as well as the fact that firms’ price adjustment costs prevent a
full alignment of relative prices in period 2.
As expected, capacity utilization drops along with aggregate output.
The share of firm below their capacity constraint F
(
b¯
)
decreases as well. This
is not only due to the reduction in demand for intermediates, but also due
to the increase in firms’ willingness to supply their respective variety: With
nominal intermediate goods prices fixed at p, the decrease in the aggregate
price level P leads to a temporarily high relative price.
7More precisely, one chooses an appropriate ‘burn-in’ period and a large number I of
simulations indexed by i. For each simulation one simulates the model forward such that
the model economy is at some random point Si,0 of its ergodic state set. Next, one draws a
sequence of aggregate shocks {Zi,t}Tt=1 of length T equal to the desired time horizon of the
impulse response, and simulates the model forward twice starting from Si,0: Once, using
only the shocks {Zi,t}, and once using the same shocks where for Zi,1 an additional 1-sd
shock the exogenous state variable has been added. The simulated impulse response is then
just the difference between the two simulations, averaged over all I repetitions. For more
details see, for example, Adjemian et al. (2011).
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Figure 1.3: Impulse Response Functions
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Notes: Simulated impulse response functions for a positive 1-sd shock to the leisure preference
ϕt in period 1. Y-axes show log-deviations from the non-stochastic steady state. A description
of the simulation procedure is given in footnote 7.
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1.5.2.2 Output asymmetry
We now turn to an assessment of the implications for the stylized facts
in general equilibrium. Quantitatively, the model explains around 1/4 of the
observed asymmetry in output, and explains fluctuations in the fiscal multiplier
of around 0.12.
For the difference between large positive and negative deviations in
output, following the approach from the empirical section, we choose an integer
N of around 1/6 of the observations (N = 1666 out of 10, 000 simulated
periods) and compare the mean of the N/2 periods with highest output to
the N/2 periods where output is lowest. As shown in Table 1.3, the average
large recession in that sense is −3.45% below trend, whereas the average large
expansion is 3.24% above trend. Output is also negatively skewed with a
coefficient of −0.11.
Comparing this to the empirical equivalents in Table 1.1, the differences
between positive and negative output deviations in the model cover around
a quarter of those in the data. In the model, recessions are 0.21 percentage
points (or a bit more than 6%) deeper than expansions. As the model was
calibrated to match the standard deviation of HP(1600)-filtered, the closest
comparable measure is the first row of Table 1.1 showing a relative difference
of 23%, or 0.7 percentage points.
Regarding the other aggregate time series also listed in Table 1.3, the
model generates asymmetry in levels of investment as well as levels of hours
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worked, but not for the level of consumption nor the growth rate of output —
all these patterns are consistent with empirical findings discussed in section
1.2 and replicated in the Table. The simulation does not exhibit asymmetry in
growth rates of employment, even though there is some empirical evidence for
this (e.g McKay and Reis (2008)). The reason here is that in the model with
its perfectly flexible labor markets the employment and output series move
together very closely.
1.5.2.3 Cross-sectional volatility
To assess the correlation of profitability dispersion and output, we con-
sider the cross-sectional standard deviation of log(profitabilityi). Profitability
is measured as firm i’s priced Solow residual piSRi = piyi/(k
α
i l
1−α
i ) which has
the interpretation of “revenue in dollars per input factor basket”. As discussed
above, this measure uses rented capacity as a measure of capital input — of
course firms’ true physical productivity yi/(k˜
α
i l
1−α) is constant by definition.
It can then be shown that a firm’s profitability is only a function of its price
and demand shock (see appendix 1.3). Since all firms choose the same price,
profitability dispersion only depends on the variance of realized demand up to
capacity min
{
bi, b¯
}
with
Var (log(piSRi)) =
(
α
2− α
)2
Var
(
log
(
min
{
bi, b¯
}))
.
This means that profitability dispersion is only a function of the cutoff level
b¯, such that its correlation with output will mirror the correlation of b¯ with
output. In the simulations the correlation corr(sd(log(SRi))t, Yt) = −0.93 is
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correspondingly strong, and indeed higher than the −0.4 to −0.5 that have
been measured in Kehrig (2013) and Bloom et al. (2012). This high correlation
in the model results from the close comovement between aggregate output and
the level of constrained firms we saw in the impulse response functions.
The mechanism of binding capacity constraints has implications for
further measures of aggregate uncertainty. In particular, we can look at
conditional volatility both at the aggregate and the firm level.
Turning to the aggregate level first, we construct a measure of aggregate
volatility from the simulated output series. For this, we look at the vari-
ance in the growth rates of output in recessions and expansions, respectively.
Specifically, we compute sd(log(Yt+1/Yt)) conditional on Yt being in its lowest
or highest quintile. We expect the variance of output growth to be large in
recessions: The more firms are far away from their capacity constraint, the
stronger the output effects a shock of a given size has. In the model here there
actually exists a dampening effect in that firms can adjust their capacity levels
and prices quickly in response to an aggregate shock. This allows firms to
lower their capacity after the realization of a bad shock, which in turn increases
the number of firms at their constraint. If it took firms longer to react, say
with a ‘time to build’ of two periods instead of one, we would expect to see a
significantly stronger movements in aggregate conditional volatilities.
Table 1.4 lists the volatility of several model time-series in the first two
columns. Going from boom to recession, the standard deviation of output
growth increases from 1.49% to 1.66%. The model’s investment and labor series
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exhibit countercyclical conditional volatilities as well, whereas consumption
volatility stays constant over the cycle. In the model, aggregate risk as measured
by the volatility of output increases by 10.8%. We also construct the empirical
analogues of the volatility measures using US data, which are shown in columns
3 and 4 of Table 1.4. As in the baseline empirical specification of Table 1.1, we
consider as recessions the 20 quarters since 1949 in which detrended output
was lowest. In the data, output volatility in a recession is 39.5% higher in
recessions than in booms and thus fluctuates a bit stronger than in the model.
Additionally, in the US series both investment and consumption exhibit cyclical
volatilities, whereas in our model households are generally able to smooth
consumption very well as they do not face any frictions.
Using different empirical strategies, Bloom et al. (2012) find that reces-
sions are associated with a 23% higher standard deviation of output (compared
to normal times), and Bachmann and Bayer (2013b) obtain a difference of
around 35% between booms and recessions, in line with the empirical values
found here. Based on these estimates, the model covers between a third to a
quarter of observed fluctuations in aggregate output volatility.
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Table 1.4: Aggregate risk: Conditional Volatilities of Aggregate
Variables
Model Data
Variable Expansion Recession Expansion Recession
Output Y 1.49% 1.66% 0.95% 1.41%
Labor L 1.59% 1.77% 0.68% 1.08%
Investment I 9.66% 11.97% 5.21% 5.91%
Consumption C 0.19% 0.20% 1.08% 0.68%
Notes: Standard deviation of growth rate in expansion/recession in the
model. For time series X, conditional volatility in recession is computed as
the standard deviation of growth rates following a recessionary quarter; i.e.
we compute sd(logXt+1 − logXt|Xt in recession). Analogous for expansions.
Recessions and expansions as defined in Table 1.1 (baseline specification) and
section 1.5.2.2; in particular output is among the lowest/highest 20 periods
(data) and lowest/highest 833 periods (simulated model series).
We proceed in a similar way to look at the variance in growth rates at
the firm level. Specifically, we draw idiosyncratic demand shocks for a panel of
1000 simulated firms and follow them for the full duration of the simulation.
Keeping track of their levels of profitability (as seen above, firm level output is
directly linked to profitability) we again compute the respective growth rate as
log difference, and then assess how much the cross-sectional variance in growth
rates8 varies conditional on being in a recession or expansion. The numerical
effects here are small, as the standard deviation of profitability growth (in
log-differences) is 18.57% in a recession versus 18.43% in a boom. The intuition
behind this is the following: Given a constant variance of the idiosyncratic
shock, the only thing that affects the variance of growth rates is the likelihood
8Due to the iid nature of the idiosyncratic demand shocks it actually does not matter
much whether one considers the time-series mean of the crosss-sectional variance in growth
rates between firms, or the cross-sectional mean in the time-series variance of one firm.
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F
(
b¯t
)
of running into the capacity constraint. Because F
(
b¯t
)
only moves little
over the cycle, individual firms’ growth rates do not vary much either.
1.5.2.4 Aggregate Solow residual and fiscal multiplier
We construct the aggregate Solow residual in a similar way as its firm-
level equivalent. We compute the uncorrected Solow residual as SRsimple,t =
Yt/
(
Kαt L
1−α
t
)
using aggregate capital in the denominator, and the corre-
sponding version corrected for utilization as SRcorr,t = Yt/
(
K˜αt L
1−α
t
)
where
K˜t =
∫
i
k˜itdi is defined as the aggregate utilized capital. Figure 1.4 displays
the log deviations from the mean for output as well as both Solow residual for
a subset of the simulated periods. As in Basu et al. (2006) and Fernald (2012),
the correlation between the simple TFP measure with output is strong with a
value of 0.76. Utilization-corrected productivity on the other hand barely moves
over the cycle.9 The standard deviation of simple TFP growth in the simulated
series is 0.52%. This value is a little smaller than the corresponding measure in
John Fernald’s quarterly dataset where the uncorrected Solow residual grows
with a standard deviation of 0.87%.
Finally, we consider the cyclicality of the contemporaneous fiscal multi-
plier dYt/dGt. In constructing it we follow Sims and Wolff by averaging the
state variables over those periods in which production is in its lowest quintile.
9Strictly, even utilization-corrected TFP fluctuates over time because of changes in the
composition of input factors and their allocation between firms. Since corrected TFP has a
very small variance (it has a standard deviation of 0.00018), however, even a tiny amount of
noise —like measurement error— renders it acyclical.
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Figure 1.4: Output and TFP measures
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Notes: Output (solid blue line) is Yt, simple TFP (red dashed line) is measured as
Yt/(K
α
t L
1−α
t ), corrected TFP (green dash-dotted line) is measured as Yt/(K˜
α
t L
1−α
t ). Y-axis
displays log-differences from non-stochastic steady state. X-axis displays a window of 100
periods out of the 10, 000 simulation periods.
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We compare output in this “average bad state” to output in the same state,
but with an additional small positive shock to government spending. More
formally, if S is the aggregate state, and S + ∆G the aggregate state after
small fiscal spending shock ∆G, the government multiplier is computed as(
Y S+∆G − Y S) /∆G. The value of the multiplier when output is in its top
quintile is computed the same way. We obtain values of 1.07 for the multiplier
in a recession, and 0.95 for a multiplier in a boom.
1.5.2.5 Role of heterogeneity, discussion and sensitivity
Variance of idiosyncratic shocks The variance of idiosyncratic
demand shocks, parameterized by σb, directly influences how many firms are
capacity constrained. It is instructive to consider how model results depend on
this parameter. Figure 1.5 shows this for several outcomes. The graph in upper
left displays the share of constrained firms in steady state. Unsurprisingly,
the wider the distribution of idiosyncratic demand shocks, the more firms
face a level of demand exceeding their capacity. The next two graphs show
output deviations from steady state for booms and recessions (top right), and
the relative size of these deviations to each other (bottom left), respectively.
Notably, output asymmetry is non-monotonic in σb. Why is this? What
matters is the average change in the share of constrained firms over the cycle,
and not its absolute level. Those differences in F
(
b¯t
)
between expansion and
recessions are largest for an interior value of σb. At a low value of 0.3 there
are practically no constrained firms in equilibrium, and recessions are around
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Figure 1.5: Varying Idiosyncratic Shock Variance σb
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Notes: X-axes display value for σb. On Y-axes: Top left – Fraction of unconstrained firms
F (b¯) in the non-stochastic steady state. Top right – Absolute log deviations of recessions and
expansions from non-stochastic steady state. Bottom left – Log difference between absolute
deviations in recession and expansion (i.e. log difference of the curves in top right). Bottom
right – Government multiplier in recession and expansion.
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3.5%, or 0.13 percentage points, larger than expansions. (Even when there is
no heterogeneity between firms there is some concavity in production through
the convex capacity utilization cost.) Increasing the standard deviation σb to
around 0.75 makes recessions more than 6% larger than expansions. For high
values of σb, output asymmetry is reduced again because, despite a larger share
of constrained firms in steady-state, the change in this share over the cycle is
smaller.
A similar pattern can be observed for the fiscal multiplier in the bottom
right graph of Figure 1.5. When virtually no firms are capacity constrained,
the timing of government spending does not matter for its effect on output —
all firms can increase their production in response to government demand. The
cyclicality of the multiplier is strongest when the fluctuations in F
(
b¯t
)
over
the cycle are large. In this case comparatively many firms have idle capacities
in a recession and can respond to an increase in government demand.
Summarizing, the firm heterogeneity causing capacity constraints to
bind occasionally matters in this model because it generates cyclicality in the
fiscal multiplier and the cross-sectional profitability dispersion, and it amplifies
the deepness of recessions.
Effect size Is it possible for the same mechanism to deliver stronger
effects? One can think of several factors potentially affecting the results.
First, the model is only solved locally, i.e. any effects of aggregate
fluctuations are captured by evaluation of the first and second derivative of
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the equilibrium conditions at the steady state. Any higher-order concavity in
the relation between shock size and output is lost when moving away from the
steady-state and could only be recovered through a global solution method.
Second, the model has little internal propagation due to the one-period-
ahead choices of prices and capacity. Firms are thus very quick to adjust to
aggregate shocks, such that it is hard for individual shocks to “add up” over
time. In fact it is predominantly the innovation to the aggregate state variable
ϕt that matters for chance of binding capacity constraints. Since the model is
solved up to a second-order approximation, effect sizes increase linearly in the
size of the aggregate shock. As an illustration, if one detrends quarterly GDP
since 1949 with a linear filter (instead of the HP(1600) filter used in calibration)
this implies a considerably higher standard deviation of the detrended series
of 4.7% instead of 1.8%. In the model this means correspondingly stronger
effects of output deviations of −9.57% and 8.12% for average recessions and
expansions, respectively; and values of 1.17 and 0.85 for the recessionary and
expansionary fiscal multiplier, respectively. Similar effects can be expected
by increasing the “time to build” (and price-set) from one period to a longer
horizon.
Finally, the mechanism may have relevant interactions with further
types of frictions often considered within the framework of New Keynesian
models. Including the mechanism in a richer environment (which may also
allow for estimation of the model parameters) is the subject of work in progress.
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1.6 Conclusion
This paper includes occasionally binding capacity constraints in a DSGE
framework under demand shocks and shows that the model replicates several
stylized facts of US output: Recessions are deep; they are times of high cross-
sectional and aggregate volatility; and they are times when fiscal policy is
particularly effective. Since firms choose their capital utilization after capacity
has been installed, the mechanism also generates a fourth stylized fact, namely
an endogenously procylical Solow residual.
A calibrated New Keynesian model yields differences in output between
booms and recessions of around 0.21 percentage points, such that the model
explains more than a quarter of the 0.7 percentage-point difference we find
empirically. While the empirical literature has not settled on the size of
fluctuations in the government spending multiplier over the cycle, in our basic
model we find a multiplier of on average 0.95 in booms and 1.07 in recessions.
The multiplier increases with the severity of recessions.
Possible extensions of the model include the addition of frictions that
are likely to interact with the capacity mechanism, like time-to-build and wage
rigidities. A different direction of further research is to try to expand the
amount of firm heterogeneity in the model which is currently limited by our
choice of a second-order approximation as solution technique. In particular, in
equilibrium all firms choose the same price and capacity before uncertainty is
realized. It would be interesting to allow firms’ responses to differ along these
dimensions, which would likely require global solution methods. This could
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add a stronger intertemporal component to the model and would allow a more
explicit look at aggregate non-linearities.
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Chapter 2
Endogenous profitability risk
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, the empirical finding that recessions are associated
with an increase in volatility of firm profitability has been widely documented.
A number of papers has since shown that this correlation can be driven by
the effects of exogenous movements in firm risk (fittingly called “uncertainty
shocks”, e.g. Bloom (2009)). A smaller strand of the literature has examined
the other direction of causation, investigating how cross-sectional dispersion
among firms can increase following a worsening of aggregate conditions. In both
cases, most papers have focused on firms’ physical productivity as a measure of
firm profitability, and how this cross-sectional productivity dispersion interacts
with the business cycle.
This paper explicitly models firms’ pricing decisions to account for
differences in physical productivity (TFP) and revenue productivity (TFPR or
“profitability”)1. The aim is to assess how much of the measured profitability
dispersion can potentially arise from conventional first-moment shocks to TFP
1Foster et al. (2005) have shown that this distinction can be important for firm dynamics
for the case of entry and exit decisions.
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even when the underlying TFP dispersion is constant. To do so, the model
combines the standard simple pricing behavior derived from monopolistic
competition with two frictions often used in uncertainty-shock models: non-
convex adjustment costs and costly financial intermediation. I choose these
two frictions in order to make the model comparable to models that rely on
uncertainty shocks to generate dispersion in TFPR. Moreover, the inclusion of
a financial channel allows me to assess consistency of the model with data on
the financial state of firms which is frequently interpreted as a channel through
which firm risk operates.
The model’s profitability distribution is driven by firms’ heterogeneous
investment policies when responding to an aggregate shock. The particular
frictions to generate this heterogeneity are fixed costs of capital adjustment and
a borrowing friction in the style of Gilchrist et al. (2013). In a recession, firms
with high idiosyncratic TFP reduce their output stronger than low-TFP firms.
As a consequence, low-TFP firms’ prices fall, lowering their profitability further
relative to high-TFP firms. This mechanism spreads out the profitability
distribution, such that its dispersion is countercyclical. Additionally, credit
spreads and credit spread dispersion rise because default risk increases.
In simulations, the calibrated model generates around two-thirds (69%)
of the time-series volatility in profitability dispersion found by Kehrig (2013).
It also creates around 40% of fluctuations in credit spreads as measured by the
GZ credit spread index (Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2011)). Thus the model gives
an alternative explanation for the increase of firm risk in recessions, suggesting
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that exogenous uncertainty shocks needed to explain the remainder may be
smaller than previously thought.
The countercyclicality of a number of cross-sectional dispersion measures
has emerged as a fairly robust empirical finding. Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006)
document that capital productivity is more dispersed in recessions. In seminal
papers, Bloom (2009) and Bloom et al. (2012) show that the distribution of
stock returns, firm sales growth, shocks to plant TFPR, and sectoral output
all become wider when aggregate output is low. Kehrig (2013) establishes
that dispersion in the level of profitability is countercyclical, especially for
unproductive firms.
If one takes increases in firm risk as exogenous, there are two prominent
ways in which these uncertainty shocks can generate recessions. The first
channel is a real-options effect: If it is costly to adjust production inputs
it may be worth holding off doing so until the economic environment is less
uncertain (Bachmann and Bayer (2013b) have dubbed this the “wait-and-see
effect”). In this way high firm risk can reduce investment and hiring, thereby
lowering output in subsequent periods. This is the mechanism used in Bloom
(2009), Bloom et al. (2012), and Bachmann and Bayer (2013a). A second
channel is through financial intermediation. If firms need to borrow funds
in order to invest, then high firm risk will make it more likely that the firm
ends up defaulting on its debt. This drives up the risk premium which in
turn dampens investment. Models utilizing this effect include Christiano et al.
(2013), Arellano et al. (2012) and Gilchrist et al. (2013).
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There are also a variety of papers that endogenize countercyclical pro-
ductivity dispersion. Kehrig (2013) shows that in a model of entry and exit
under overhead costs the marginal entrant’s productivity can be procyclical,
implying a tighter productivity distribution in a boom. Cui (2013) builds
a vintage model of capital in which capital reallocation is procyclical and
consequently recessions are times when relatively unproductive machinery is
still being utilized. In Decker et al. (2014), intangible capital investment is
needed to access markets. Firms find it optimal to invest more heavily in
intangibles during a boom, giving them access to a larger number of markets
such that market-specific risk smoothes out. Finally, Bachmann and Moscarini
(2012) provide a model of demand uncertainty in which firms are unsure if a
drop in demand is due to weak aggregate demand, which is transient, or due
to weak private demand, which is permanent. In order to learn about their
permanent demand elasticity, firms find it profitable to experiment by setting
a higher price in recessions when the opportunity cost of foregoing profits is
low. This in turn increases dispersion in sales among firms.
This paper is similar to Bachmann and Moscarini (2012) in the sense
that to my knowledge they are the only two papers explicitly modeling prices in
a framework of endogenous firm risk. In the present paper, however, firms face
idiosyncratic TFP shocks, allowing me to investigate the relationship between
physical productivity and profitability, whereas in Bachmann and Moscarini
firms differ in their (constant) demand elasticity and an idiosyncratic demand
shock. This paper is also close to Gilchrist et al. (2013) in the sense that their
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paper includes both real adjustment costs and costly financial intermediation
(in fact the mechanism of the financial friction here is taken from their paper).
Their focus however is on the effect of second-moment shocks on aggregate
outcomes. While they do consider aggregate TFP shocks, these shocks can
not generate revenue productivity dispersion since firms all produce the same
output good and thus no pricing mechanism exists.
The outline of the paper is as follows: The next section 2.2 describes
the model setup. Section 2.3 aims to give the intuition how adjustment costs
generate endogenous TFPR dispersion. In section 2.4 I discuss calibration and
results, and section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Households
The model’s household and final goods sectors are kept as simple as
possible. The representative household works for a fixed amount of hours
and owns the firms in the other sectors. Hence, in any period her only
decision is between consumption Ct and saving St. Savings are deposited in
the representative bank discussed below. Normalizing her labor supply to
one, the household’s labor income is equal to the wage wt. She also earns
capital income from past savings Rt−1St−1, where Rt−1 is the risk-free real
interest rate determined last period. Finally, she receives all profits Πt from
the final goods, banking, and intermediate goods sectors, respectively, such
54
that Πt ≡ pift + pibt + piit. Consequently her flow budget constraint is
Ct + St = wt +Rt−1St−1 + Πt
Subject to the sequence of budget constraints, the household maximizes
U ({Ct}∞t=0) = Et
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
1
1− ψC
1−ψ
t
]
. (2.1)
2.2.2 Final goods sector
The final goods sector is represented by a single competitive firm func-
tioning as a standard CES aggregator. It uses as input a continuum of inter-
mediate goods {yit}i∈[0,1], where i indexes the variety of the good. Production
according to a function F yields output Yt = F ({yit}) which can be used for
consumption and investment. All prices in the economy are expressed in units
of the final good, i.e its price is normalized to 1. As usual for this type of
model the production function F is given by
F ({yit}) =
(∫ 1
i=0
y
σ−1
σ
it di
) σ
σ−1
where the parameter σ measures the elasticity of substition between inter-
mediate goods. Taking prices {pit} of the intermediates goods as given, the
standard inverse demand curve for input i follows from the final goods firm’s
maximiation problem as
pit(qit) =
(
Yt
qit
) 1
σ
.
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2.2.3 Banks
The banking sector constitutes the only source of financing for the
intermediate goods firms. By assumption, firms can not raise equity and
instead have to rely on external finance. These loans are risky, because there is
a chance that a firm will default and trigger a state verification process which
generates additional costs to the lender. Because of this friction, which will be
discussed in detail in the next section, each individual loan may be repaid to
the bank either fully, partially, or not at all.
There is a large number of atomistic, perfectly competitive banks that
each hold a fully diversified portfolio of loans and deposits — this is equivalent
to modeling the sector by a representative bank operating under a zero-expected-
profit condition. The bank receives deposits St from the households on which
it pays the risk-free interest rate Rt determined this period. On the other
side of the budget constraint stand loans to intermediate goods firms, and
their aggregate repayments. The latter include the sum of all full and partial
repayments minus the state-verification costs that are due in the case of default.
Finally, while the bank absorbs all idiosynratic firm risk through the law of
large numbers, it cannot hedge against the risk of aggregate shocks which
influence the default rate. This risk is passed on to the bank’s owners, the
households, via positive or negative profits. These accounting profits are given
by
pibt = St + Rept −Rt−1St−1 − Loanst
where Repayments and Loans will be defined as aggregates below.
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By the assumption of perfect competition embedded in the representative
bank, the risk-neutral bank takes loan rates that it can charge firms as given.
In particular, if a firm approaches a bank requesting a loan of size b, the bank’s
optimization problem is simply to decide whether to grant the loan or to walk
away. As discussed below, this implies that in equilibrium the bank’s expected
return on a loan to a firm is just equal to the risk-free interest rate.
2.2.4 Intermediate goods producers
The intermediate goods sector is where the two main frictions, nonconvex
adjustment costs and borrowing under costly state verification, are built into
the model. Firms accumulate capital and are subject to idiosyncratic and
aggregate productivity shocks. They have the option of borrowing from a bank.
The interest rate of the loan is firm-specific; that is, the firm borrows against
its future profits and capital stock, and the loan rate reflects the size of that
collateral and the risk of default.
Production and adjustment cost Production is assumed to follow the
Cobb-Douglas form and is given by
f(z, A, k, l) = zAkαl1−α.
Capital k is quasi-fixed and can be changed only with a lag of one period
via investment whereas labor input l is fully flexible and can be hired as
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needed every period.2 Physical productivity evolves exogenously according to
an idiosyncratic and an aggregate shock process {zjt}t and {At}t, respectively.
Both will be specified as log-normal AR-1 processes. The firm takes into
account the demand function for its goods from the final goods sector.
Next period’s capital k′ is determined today by the standard accumula-
tion rule
k′ = (1− δ)k + I,
where I represents investment in the current period. Finally, as far as production
technology goes, there is a fixed cost φ to capital adjustment. I assume the
adjustment cost has to be paid if k′ 6= (1− g)k where g  δ is a small positive
number (and matters only to avoid an indeterminate steady state). Intuitively,
if the firm wants to change its capital stock at all (besides the small change
through g), the fixed cost is due. This assumption aims to make capital
adjustment upward and downward approximately symmetric.
Borrowing problem In order to introduce a financial dimension to the firm
problem I assume that for undertaking investment the firm has to rely on
external finance. This loan market is subject to costly state verification in case
of default, a commonly used type of financial friction3. The particular setup
2In order to keep the model’s state space small, I do not consider the case of additional
adjustment frictions in the labor input of the firm. This is despite the fact that, for example
in Bloom et al. (2012) it is actually the labor friction that has the largest impact on aggregate
dynamics. Allowing for stronger frictions on input factors would most likely strengthen the
results here, as firms will find it even harder to achieve their desired revenue product which
leads to more dispersion.
3See Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999) for seminal papers.
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is taken from Gilchrist et al. (2013). Their version of the borrowing problem
allows for substantial firm heterogeneity (in particular admitting persistent
differences in physical productivity), and yields endogenous credit spreads while
remaining computationally tractable.
Firms can sell bonds b at a price of q that entitle the buyer to 1 unit of
tomorrow’s consumption good. The firm-specific price of the bond determines
the implicit interest rate the firm faces, and will be determined by the marginal
risk of default. Default risk exists because, by assumption, there is a minimum
amount of net worth denominated n¯, that is not enforceable for repayment. In
other words, lenders can enforce repayment only up to the point where the
borrower’s net worth is just n¯, so that if b > n − n¯ default occurs (where n
denotes the firm’s net worth just before repayment is due). If the firm is unable
to repay the lender in full, default is partial if n > n¯ and total if n ≤ n¯.
Besides the loss of the principal, there is an additional state-verification
cost that the lender has to bear in case of default which represents his cost of
determining the borrower’s remaining net worth. As a simplifying assumption,
the default cost is assumed to be proportional to the size of the original loan.
A further assumption is that the cost is always due in case of default — in
particular, there is no decision to be made by the lender about whether it
might be worth to walk away from the loan entirely and avoid paying the
state-verification cost.
A final element of the friction is a discount parameter γ which represents
the firms’ preference for dividend payments over future profits. It measures
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to which extent the intermediate goods firms discount future income stronger
than households. The presence of this parameter with a value strictly less than
1 is a standard way to prevent firms from saving their way out of the borrowing
constraint.
Timing The period starts with draws of aggregate productivity At and
the set of idiosyncratic productivity states {zit}. With the resolution of
aggregate uncertainty all aggregate variables in period t are determined, and
the economy’s aggregate state is given by Σ ≡ (A, µ). The function µ is the
density of the distribution of firms over (z, k, b). Next, intermediate goods
firms hire the optimal amount of labor lit given their capital stock kit and
productivity zit, regardless of their level of debt. After production occurs at
the intermediate and final goods level, intermediate goods firms consider their
net worth nit = (1− δ)kit + pi(zit, kit,Σt) composed of undepreciated capital
and revenue net of wages. As described in the previous section a firm then
defaults if nit − n¯ < bit or otherwise repays its debt bit in full. In either case
the firm is left with an end-of-period net worth n˜it, and since there is no
‘punishment’ for default in terms of an exclusion from credit markets, the firm’s
state after production is captured by the end-of-period net worth together with
the undepreciated capital stock and physical productivity. The firm now has to
pick its desired levels of investment and borrowing which, through the budget
constraint, also determines dividend payments to its owners.
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Optimal choices and firm value With labor hired on the spot it is straight-
forward to write down a function for revenue net of wages as
pi(z, A, k) ≡ max
l
f(z, A, k, l)−
σ−1
σ Y
1
σ − wl
= C(w)
[
(Azkα)σ−1 Y
] 1
1−α+ασ .
where C(w) ≡ 1−α+ασ
σ
[
(σ−1)(1−α)
σw
] (σ−1)(1−α)
1−α+ασ
. The maximizing labor input follows
as
l(z, A, k) =
{[
(σ − 1)(1− α)
σw
]σ
(Azkα)σ−1 Y
} 1
1−α+σα
. (2.2)
Of course with capital quasi-fixed, with its choice of labor the firm simultane-
ously picks production y, price p and its revenue product pz.
The firm-specific bond price follows directly as a no-arbitrage constraint
from the bank’s zero-profit condition. In expectation, a loan to the firm will
yield the risk-neutral bank the same return as an investment at the safe interest
rate Rt. The bond price as a function of the loan size, next period’s capital,
and this period’s firm productivity is then given by
qb(z, k
′, b′,Σ) =
1
R
EA
{
1− F (¯) (1 + χ) + [F (¯)− F ()]
[
(1− δ) k − n¯
b′
]
+
+
C (w′)
[
(A′zρzk′α)σ−1 Y ′
] 1
1−α+ασ
b′
eσ
2
ν/2
2
×
×
[
erf
(
σ2ν − log (ν)√
2σν
)
− erf
(
σ2ν − log (ν¯)√
2σν
)]}
.
(2.3)
where ¯, , ν¯ and ν are cutoff values for productivity shocks that in turn lead to
the threshold productivities z¯ and z for partial and total default, respectively;
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erf denotes the error function. For details see appendix 2.1 and Gilchrist et al.
(2013).
The firm’s optimal borrowing and investment choices are then repre-
sented by the firm’s value function. The firm’s value depends on the idiosyn-
cratic state variables (z, k, b) and on the aggregate state Σ, and the choice
variables are next period’s capital k′ and debt b′. The choice of capital can be
thought of as two sequential decisions: A discrete one whether to adjust at all,
and, if the answer is yes, an unconstrained choice about the level of investment.
Representing the investment decision as this two-step process makes it easy to
write down the value function as the maximum of the value of adjusting and
the value of not adjusting capital, denoted by Va and Vn respectively. Denote
the binary decision whether to adjust 1adj (z, k, b,Σ).
V (z, k, b,Σ) = max
1adj∈{0,1}
1adjVa (z, n˜(z, k, b,Σ),Σ) + [1− 1adj]Vn (z, k, b,Σ)
(2.4)
If the firm chooses adjustment and the fixed cost has been paid its
current capital stock relevant only in so far as it contributes to the firm’s net
worth. Its value is therefore a function of just productivity and net worth
Va (z, n˜,Σ) = max
k′,b′
n˜+ q (z, k′, b′,Σ) b′ − k′ + γEz,Σ [d(Σ′,Σ)V (z′, k′, b′,Σ′)] .
(2.5)
The policy functions for next period’s capital and debt conditional on adjust-
ment are denoted k′a (z, k, b, S) and b
′
a (z, k, b,Σ), respectively.
On the other hand if the firm has made the decision to save the adjust-
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ment cost and stay at its current level of capital, then both k and b remain
relevant state variables. while the firm’s choice is now only over the trade-off
debt/dividend payments.
Vn (z, k, b,Σ) = max
b′
n˜+ (z, k, b,Σ) q (z, (1− g)k, b′,Σ) b′ − (1− g)k
+γEz,Σ [d(Σ
′,Σ)V (z′, (1− g)k, b′,Σ′)]
(2.6)
Denote the firm’s bond supply choice conditional on not adjusting the capital
stock b′n (z, k, b,Σ). The corresponding policy function for capital is trivially
given as k′n (z, k, b, S) = (1− g)k. The function d (Σ′,Σ) represents the house-
hold’s stochastic discount factor.
Finally, from (2.4)-(2.6) the unconditional policy functions follow as
k′ (z, k, b,Σ) = 1adj (z, k, b,Σ) k′a (z, k, b,Σ) + [1− 1adj (z, k, b,Σ)] k′n (z, k, b,Σ)
and
b′ (z, k, b,Σ) = 1adj (z, k, b,Σ) b′a (z, k, b,Σ) + [1− 1adj (z, k, b,Σ)] b′n (z, k, b,Σ) .
2.2.5 Aggregation and Recursive Equilibrium
There are three aggregate markets in the economy: the market for final
goods, the market for labor, and the market for loans. Aggregate supply and
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demand on each of these markets are:
Ls = 1
Ld =
∫
(z,k,b)
l (z, k,Σ) dµ (z, k, b)
(2.7)
Y s =
[∫
(z,k,b)
(ys (z, k,Σ))
σ−1
σ dµ (z, k, b)
] σ
σ−1
Y d = C + I + Mon + Φ
(2.8)
Loans = S
Loand =
∫
(z,k,b)
qb (z, k
′(z, k, b,Σ), b′(z, k, b,Σ),Σ)×
b′ (z, k, b,Σ) dµ (z, k, b) .
(2.9)
In equation (2.8), aggregate monitoring cost and aggregate adjustment cost
paid are defined as
Mon = χ
∫
(z,k,b)
b1z<z¯(k,b,Σ)dµ (z, k, b)
and
Φ = φ
∫
(z,k,b)
1adj (z, k, b,Σ) dµ (z, k, b) ,
respectively.
A recursive equilibrium is composed of a set of value functions, policy
functions, pricing functions, as well as a law of motion that are consistent with
agent optimization, market clearing, and rational expectations.
Specifically,
• the functions S (Σ) , C (Σ) are the policy functions derived from the
household’s problem (2.1) and U∗ (Σ) is maximized lifetime utility; the
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functions V (z, k, b,Σ), Va (z, n˜,Σ), Vn (z, k, b,Σ) are an intermediate
goods firm’s value functions (2.4)-(2.6) and l (z, k, b,Σ), k′ (z, k, b,Σ),
b′ (z, k, b,Σ) are the corresponding policy functions;
• Wages are given by w (Σ), interest rates by R (Σ), bond prices by
qb(z, k
′, b′,Σ)
• Markets in equations (2.7) - (2.9) clear, i.e. Ls = Ld, Y s = Y d, and
Loans = Loand.
• The law of motion µ′ (µ,A) for the evolution of distribution over (z, k, b)
follows from the firms’ policy functions and the exogenous process for z.
2.3 Determinants of the profitability distribution
The aim of this section is to give an intuition for how cross sectional
dispersion in revenue productivity can arise when one includes firm pricing. I
will first discuss the general TFPR distribution and how it interacts with the
real friction, and then turn to the financial friction.
Non-convex adjustment costs The general mechanism is that, if there are
frictions, firms’ investment need not react symmetrically in response to shocks.
Considering the example of fixed adjustment costs, physically productive firms
are more likely to adjust, since for these firms the relative benefit of adjustment
is larger. This in turn will reset their revenue product towards the level chosen
if there were no adjustment costs. The non-adjusters on the other hand will
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tend to be physically unproductive firms. Not adjusting fully to a, say, negative
shock in physical productivity levels will leave these firms with too much factor
inputs and cause them to overproduce relative to the frictionless case. This
drives down the price and therefore revenue productivity. Hence the left tail of
the TFPR distribution becomes wider in a recession, and conversely it becomes
shorter in a boom.
Turning to the specifics of the model, we can use the fact that labor is
a fully flexible input factor and is chosen optimally as given by (2.2). One can
then write down an analytic expression for revenue productivity pAz as being
proportional the productivity states and capital:
pAz ∼ (Az) α(σ−1)1+α(σ−1) k− α1+α(σ−1) . (2.10)
Given capital, TFPR increases in physical productivity; and given productivity,
TFPR decreases in the amount of capital held by the firm.
It can be informative to consider this relationship under some extreme
cases. First, if A and z are fixed (the variance of the respective shocks is set
to 0) and there are no adjustment costs, then firms will choose the same k
equalizing their revenue product. This also corresponds to the setup often
used in models where production is linear in the fully flexible factor labor and
the TFPR distribution is degenerate (case a in figure 2.1). Second, if there is
variation in A and z while still holding adjustment costs at 0, then using the
firm’s profit function it can be shown that firms pick k in a way that equalizes
their expected revenue product. This means that any dispersion in TFPR will
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be caused by contemporanous shocks to idiosyncratic productivity z, implying
a symmetric profitability distribution (case b in figure 2.1). It is important
to note that the firms’ ranks in the TFP distribution are preserved in the
TFPR distribution: a higher physical productivity implies a higher revenue
productivity. Additionally, for a given variance of shocks to z, dispersion is
increasing in α (the more the quasi-fixed factor is used in production, the more
dispersion) and increasing in σ (the higher the price elasticity of demand, the
more dispersion).
Third, say the level of idiosyncratic TFP z displays some persistence
and that there are positive adjustment costs. As discussed above, assume
they are such that firms with high z find it profitable to adjust their capital
stock in response to a given change in A, while firms with low z do not.
Then next period’s capital is going to be correlated with productivity: For
example, following a negative shock to A, physically unproductive firms will
have relatively much capital, and therefore a low revenue product (case c in
figure 2.1) . Underlying this is of course the fact that these firms produce more
than they would have if capital adjustment were free, and therefore drive down
the price of their good.
Financial friction As just outlined, the effect of the aggregate state on the
profitability of firms depends on the response of investment and the associated
marginal costs of production in the following period. The question is therefore
whether a recession more strongly affects productive firms or unproductive
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Figure 2.1: Profitability distribution in special cases
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firms. Under the borrowing friction investment is influenced by the firm-specific
credit spread; so what matters is whether unproductive firms’ loan price reacts
more to a change in A than a productive firm’s loan price. Consider a case
without adjustment costs: A firm with low expected z will invest little, therefore
requiring only a small loan. Of course its expected revenues are also small.
Together these effects determine the firm’s default risk and its credit spread.
If a recession drives up productive firms’ credit spreads more than that
of unproductive firms, productive firms will have less capital and higher prices
next period, increasing dispersion in profitability. On the other hand it is
possible that a recession mainly affects unproductive firms default risk. In this
case by the same argument the TFPR distribution would become narrower
making its dispersion procyclical. Analytically it is not clear which one of the
cases applies, and in general this will depend on the specific model environment.
The calibration used below shows countercyclical TFPR dispersion when only
the financial friction is active, indicating that the effect on productive firms
dominates.
2.4 Simulation and Results
2.4.1 Simulation
Calibration For most parameter values I take existing estimates from the
literature as a baseline case. In particular, I draw on Khan and Thomas (2008)’s
model of fixed adjustment costs for a range of technology parameters, as do
Bloom et al. (2012). Table 2.1 summarizes the baseline parameter choices.
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Table 2.1: Parameter values
Parameter Value Target / Source
Household and final goods sector
Rate of time preference β 0.96 Real interest rate of 4%
EIS ψ 1 Log utility
Price elasticity of demand σ 4 Bloom et al. (2012)
Technology
Persistence of aggregate TFP ρA 0.86 Khan and Thomas (2008)
SD of innovations to A σA 0.027 Volatility of output 2.2%
Persistence of idiosyncratic TFP ρz 0.86 Khan and Thomas (2008)
SD of innovations to z σz 0.022 Khan and Thomas (2008)
Capital share α 0.2 Labor income 60%
Depreciation rate δ 0.1 Standard value
Frictions
Adjustment cost φ 0.04 2.6% spike adjusters
Depreciation when not adjusting g 0.01 Small value
Verification cost in default χ 0.10 Gilchrist et al. (2013)
Firms’ dividend preference γ 0.95 Gilchrist et al. (2013)
Borrower’s protected net worth n¯ 0.0 Gilchrist et al. (2013)
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The model is calibrated to an annual frequency in order to facilitate
computation. The household’s rate of time preference β is set to 0.96 generating
an average annual interest rate of around 4%. The household is given an
elasticity of intertemporal substitution of 1 corresponding to a log utility
function. As in Khan and Thomas (2008). I set the persistence of the aggregate
productivity process ρA = 0.86. For the standard deviation of shocks to A I
choose a value of σA = 0.027 which targets the detrended time-series volatility
of annual output in the United States of 2.2%. The elasticity of substituion
in the final goods sector is chosen to be σ = 4 implying a price elasticity
of demand for intermediate goods of −4. While this is on the lower end of
estimates in the literature it corresponds to the value implied by Bloom et al.
(2012)’s choice of decreasing returns to scale on the firm level.4
Turning to the intermediate goods firms, I again follow Khan and
Thomas (2008) in choosing a persistence for the idiosyncratic productivity
process that is equal to the one of the aggregate process and set ρz = 0.86.
There is a range of estimates for the variance of innovations to firm TFP in the
literature. For example, Khan and Thomas (2008) use a σz of 2.2%, and Bloom
et al. (2012) use 4%. As will be seen below, the relative TFPR dispersion over
the cycle in this model is somewhat sensitive to the choice of σz. For now I
stick to the calibration by Khan and Thomas (2008) and will discuss higher
values of σz below. As is standard in the literature, the annual depreciation
4Bloom et al. point out that the source of decreasing returns of their firms’ production
function could be derived from monopolistic competition.
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rate is set to δ = 0.10. For the parameter g that describes capital shrinkage in
the case of non-adjustment I ad-hoc pick 0.01 as a ‘small value’. The elasticity
of intermediate firm output with respect to capital is set to α = 0.2. Given
demand elasticity σ above, this value matches a 60% labor share of output as
α and σ determine the monopolistic firms’ profits jointly.
What remains is to set the parameters governing the model’s frictions.
For the financial friction I follow Gilchrist et al. (2013) in setting the default
cost to χ = 0.10, the preference rate for dividend payments to γ = 0.95 and
the level of protected net worth to n¯ = 0. The final parameter that needs to
be chosen is the fixed adjustment cost φ. These costs are usually calibrated
to match a moment of the distribution of investment rates; oftentimes this is
the share of ‘spike adjusters’ whose investment rates exceed 20%. For the US
this value is around 15% for equipment capital and around 10% for all types
of capital (including structures). These numbers however include replacement
investment. Since in the model depreciation is paid by all firms every period
(unless they adjust downward) I target a fraction of adjusters significantly
lower between 2% and 3%. For this parameter, too, I consider alternative
specifications below.
Numerical approximation I solve the model approximately using standard
techniques for the computation of heterogeneous agent DSGE models. I briefly
outline the procedure here and put additional description into appendix 2.2.
The state space is discretized using a uniformly spaced grid for the
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endogenous variables k and b. The exogenous state variables z and A and
their evolution over time are approximated as discrete Markov chains using
Tauchen’s method. I use a particularly dense grid for z since the realization of
the idiosyncratic shock is essential for the default decision. Aggregate TFP
A is modeled as a process over three discrete states standing for recessions,
normal times, and booms. The distribution µ of capital and debt among firms
as endogenous aggregate variable is approximated using a grid for the first
moment of the marginal distribution of capital, K.
Agents in the economy are assumed to use the aggregate state (A,K)
to forecast other aggregate variables. Making household’s marginal utility
the nume´raire as in Khan and Thomas (2008), the variables that need to be
forecast are next period’s capital stock K ′, the wage w, the price of the final
good (in utils), as well as the output of the final good Y . The latter is relevant
because the intermediate goods firms’ output decisions and aggregate output
are interdependent through final goods firm’s demand function. With agents
thus taking all aggregates as given functions of the state variables, I use value
function iteration to derive the monopolists’ policy functions for k′ and b′. The
economy is simulated over a long time horizon. This procedure is then repeated,
updating the forecast rules iteratively until forecasts match simulated prices
and quantities as closely as possible.
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2.4.2 Results
This section discusses the model economy’s response to shocks in three
ways. First, I compare average booms and recessions to get an idea of the
cyclicality of central variables. Then I graph impulse response functions as a
way to capture the response of the economy to an isolated shock. Finally I look
at unconditional volatilities and the correlations of aggregates over the cycle to
assess the magnitude and cyclicality of the measures of interest quantitatively.
Average booms and recessions I now consider fluctuations in the level of
aggregate TFP. With TFPAmodeled as a three-point process, table 2.2 presents
model statistics for the recessionary and expansionary state of the economy
relative to the ‘neutral’ state in which A is normalized to 1, respectively.
TFPR dispersion is measured as the coefficient of variation of cross-
sectional revenue productivity.5 The mean credit spread is the average of the
differences of firm-specific interest rates as implied by their bond price and the
risk-free interest rate in the same period. Finally, dispersion of credit spreads
is again measured as the cross-sectional coefficient of variation.
These statistics were generated by simulating the full economy, and
then simply averaging over all periods in which A was, say, low. The table
qualitatively confirms that the model displays countercyclical TFPR dispersion
and worsening credit conditions: Revenue productivity is on average 9.7% more
5That is, sd(piAzi)/mean(piAzi). The coefficient of variation is useful in this context
because it is a scale invariant dispersion measure.
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Table 2.2: Recession vs boom
Recession Normal times Boom
Mean of. . .
TFP At −3.92% 1 3.92%
Output Yt −2.44% 0.99 2.61%
TFPR dispersion 3.7% 0.019 −4.4%
Mean credit spread +22 bps 88 bps −24 bps
Credit spread dispersion 21.5% 0.016 −17.9%
dispersed comparing recessions to booms, and credit spreads are 46 basis points
higher as well as 39% percent more dispersed. This table does not tell us much
about the timing of the responses to shocks, nor do we readily observe A in
the real world. Next I therefore consider impulse response functions, and will
afterwards compare the unconditional volatilities of the aggregates to the data.
Impulse response functions I obtain simulated impulse response functions
by manually holding the aggregate shock A at its long-run mean of 1 and
simulating the economy for enough periods that all aggregate variables become
approximately constant. The firms are still being hit by idiosyncratic shocks,
and in contrast to the non-stochastic steady state, they expect movements in A
according to its regular distribution (which simply don’t materialize). A large
number of economies is then seeded to this ‘neutral’ aggregate state as period 0.
In period 1 all economies are hit by a negative shock, i.e. A is set to its low value.
The economies are then simulated forward, differing in how long they remain in
the recessionary state. Specifically, for each economy, the chance of remaining
in the low state for one more period is given by the transition probabilities of A,
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Figure 2.2: Impulse response functions to negative shock in A
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and once an economy gets a draw that would put it into the ‘neutral’ or ‘high’
TFP state, its A is set back to 1 for the remainder of the simulation. This part
of the procedure ensures that all aggregate variables eventually return to their
pre-impact levels and there is no sampling randomness. The impulse response
functions for several variables are shown in figure 2.2.
The dispersion measures react as implied by theory. Revenue produc-
tivity dispersion increases by around 6%, credit spreads by around 50 bps
and credit spread dispersion by 50%. Because the profitability distribution
is only affected through the capital stock, TFPR dispersion does not react
on impact, but increases as firms carry out their different investment policies
in response to the shock. Since loan prices are determined in the period in
which investment takes place, credit spreads and credit spread dispersion react
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immediately, shooting up and flattening back out quickly.
Time series volatility I now compare the time-series variance of the model-
simulated aggregates to the ones measured in the data. Table 2.3 displays
second moments of the dispersion measures as well as the main business cycle
aggregates.6
The empirical moments in table 2.3 are compiled from several sources.
The data on revenue productivity dispersion is calculated using Kehrig (2013)’s
annual time series on the median sectoral coefficient of variation of TFPR fro
1972 to 2010.7 Similarly, the information on the level of the average credit
spread uses the GZ-credit spread index released by Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek
(2011).8 This time series ranges from 1973 to 2012. While information on the
volatility of the GZ-credit spread dispersion is not readily available, Gilchrist
and Zakrajˇsek (2011) report the correlation of output with both mean credit
spreads and the cross-sectional standard deviation of credit spreads. Finally,
the numbers for output, consumption and investment are derived from FRED9
using HP(100)-filtered data from 1950 to 2013. I apply the same HP(100)-filter
to the model-generated data for output, consumption, investment, and TFPR
dispersion.
6In case of the dispersion measures (TFPR dispersion and credit spread dispersion), the
time-series variance is the longitudinal second moment of a cross-sectional second moment.
7The data provided by Kehrig (2013) is HP(100)-filtered. Data available for download at
https://sites.google.com/site/matthiaskehrig/research
8Data available at http://people.bu.edu/sgilchri/Data/data.htm
9http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/
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Table 2.3: Time-series volatility and cyclicality
Model Data
Standard deviation of
TFPR dispersion 3.24% 4.7%
Credit spreads 36 bps 92 bps
Credit spread dispersion 24.6% n.a.
Y 2.2% 2.2%
C 2.0% 1.8%
I 6.0% 8.3%
Cyclicality
corr(Y,TFPR disp) −0.32 −0.40
corr(Y, credit spreads) −0.53 −0.46
corr(Y,CS disp) −0.60 −0.25
Consumption is a bit too volatile in the model, at the expense of an
undershoot in the variance of investment (with the volatility of Y being targeted
in the calibration). Looking at profitability dispersion, I find that the model
can explain a little more than two thirds of the empirically observed volatility
(3.24% versus 4.7%), and exhibits a similar correlation coefficient with output
as in the data (−0.32 versus the observed −0.40). The model generates close
to 40% of the fluctuations in the level of credit spreads (36 bps versus 92
bps in the GZ index), and it matches the empirical cyclicality fairly closely.
Finally, the model delivers significant swings in credit spread dispersion. This
suggests that the model’s first-moment shocks generate the empirically observed
negative relationship between recessions and financial indicators of firm risk.
Moreover, in order to generate a larger amplitude in credit spreads additional
financial frictions may be needed. For example, Gilchrist et al. (2013) in their
uncertainty-shock model supplement the borrowing friction with frictions on
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raising and lowering equity (issuing stocks and paying dividends, respectively).
Contribution of individual frictions Figure 2.3 displays the impact of
frictions separately. For this exercise, I compare four simulations: First, the
model in the baseline calibration as before; second, a model with only adjust-
ment costs where firms can borrow on a frictionless credit market (there is no
default, i.e. n¯ = −∞); third, a calibration with only financial frictions (adjust-
ment costs φ = 0); and fourth, a simple model of monopolistic competition
without real nor financial friction.
The most notable feature is that the paths of real variables between the
case of both frictions and only adjustment costs are very similar. In particular,
as long as the adjustment cost is present the responses generate a significant
increase in profitability dispersion. The financial friction on its own, however,
only leads to a small increase. Moreover, including adjustment costs raises the
baseline level of credit spreads and increases their response to a negative shock
compared to the case of the borrowing friction alone.
Table 2.4 confirms this finding: Adding the borrowing friction to a
model of non-convex adjustment costs does not change the implications for the
profitability distribution much. Conversely the adjustment cost improves the
fit compared to only the financial friction.10 Notably, the borrowing friction
10The excessive TFPR dispersion appears to be result of a nonlinearity: In the simulation,
a more than proportionate jump in credit spreads occures when the aggregate state quickly
switches from boom to recession without spending much time in the intermediate state.
Without these episodes volatility in TFPR dispersion is small.
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Figure 2.3: Impulse response functions of frictions separately
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Table 2.4: Impact of individual frictions
Friction Both Financial Real None
Standard deviation of
TFPR dispersion 3.24% 8.04% 3.16% 0
Credit spreads 36 bps 17 bps - -
Credit spread dispersion 24.6% 45% - -
Cyclicality
corr(Y,TFPR disp) −0.32 −0.17 -0.31 0
corr(Y, credit spreads) −0.53 −0.06 - -
corr(Y,CS disp) −0.60 −0.41 - -
itself does not generate the observed countercyclicality of credit spreads, a
point also found by Gilchrist et al. (2013).
Sensitivity to parameters I consider alternative specifications for two
central parameters; namely the adjustment cost φ as well as the standard
deviation of idiosyncratic productivity shocks σz. Table 2.5 contains results for
a few different parameter values.
Overall, the model economy does not respond too strongly to changes
in the adjustment cost. Lower φ mainly causes a larger share of firms to adjust
each period, generating higher volatility in aggregate investment. Volatility of
the profitability distribution reacts only mildly in a non-monotonic way except
for very low values of the parameter.
Increasing σz reduces the magnitude of swings in TFPR dispersion.
Intuitively, a high variance of firm-specific shocks makes the aggregate state
less important to the firm in making its investment decisions. These decisions
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Table 2.5: Alternative parameter values
Time-series volatility (sd) (mean)
TFPR disp Cred. spread Y C I
Frac.
adjusters
Baseline
3.2% 36bps 2.2% 2.0% 6.0% 2.5%
φ
0.03 3.8% 35bps 2.2% 2.0% 5.7% 3.0%
0.02 3.6% 32bps 2.2% 1.9% 6.3% 4.3%
0.015 2.6% 35bps 2.2% 1.8% 8.1% 8.4%
0.01 7.8% 26bps 2.2% 2.0% 14.7% 75%
σz
0.04 2.7% 22bps 2.2% 1.8% 6.8% 2.8%
0.08 0.8% 22bps 2.2% 1.5% 9.0% 7.3%
are now mainly driven by the firm’s idiosyncratic state. For example, when
using the parameter value from Bloom et al. (2012) with σz = 0.04, the standard
deviation of TFPR dispersion is 2.7% or 55% of the empirical estimate, and
decreases further for higher σz.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper shows that profitability dispersion among firms can arise
endogenously in a response to a change in aggregate production levels. There-
fore recessions can look like times of increased firm risk even when underlying
productivity risk is constant over the cycle. In general, this result comes from
heterogeneity in how firms’ pricing responds to an aggregate shock. The partic-
ular structure chosen in this paper demonstrates that this differential response
can result under the same setup used in models of uncertainty shocks, employing
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non-convex adjustment costs and costly financial intermediation. The baseline
calibration generates two-thirds of the empirical observed cyclicality in levels
of revenue productivity as well as procylicality in the financial health of firms.
These results suggest that accounting for the difference between productivity
and profitability is relevant when assessing firm risk over the business cycle
and calibrating uncertainty shocks to cross-sectional moments.
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Chapter 3
Gasoline consumption and the welfare effects
of oil price shocks
3.1 Introduction
In this paper I examine how oil price shocks can directly affect household
welfare, and how these effects vary with household income. To this purpose
I focus on households’ gasoline consumption which is the main end to which
households purchase (processed) oil. I evaluate the relationship between gas
expenditures and household income empirically using data from the Consumer
Expenditure Survey. In this dataset I find that among gasoline-using households
there is a robust negative relationship between income and the share of a
household’s budget that is spent on gasoline. I replicate this finding in an
equilibrium model with two types of households who differ in their labor income.
In particular, the decreasing propensity to consume gasoline is introduced via a
fixed minimum quantity of gasoline that must be consumed by all households.
This inelastic part of a household’s gasoline consumption can be interpreted as
required for commuting to work. Any quantity of gasoline consumed beyond
this minimum level enters households utility as a complement to an output
good which represents the remainder of the consumption basket.
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The model is then calibrated to match the differences in household
consumption and gasoline expenditures between the top and the bottom half
of the income distribution. I then examine the welfare effects of a shock
to the gasoline price on either type of household by comparing a one-time
gasoline price shock to a permanent change in the steady-state labor tax. Poor
households’ welfare is almost twice as sensitive to the gasoline price as the
welfare of rich households: For example, a temporary increase of the gasoline
price from $2 to $3 is equivalent to a permanent labor tax hike of 0.5 percentage
points, whereas for poor households it is equivalent to a hike of 0.95 percentage
points.
There exists an ample literature about the effects of oil price shocks
on output, inflation and the conduct of monetary policy. Extensive reviews
of this literature can be found, for example, in Barsky and Kilian (2004) and
Hamilton (2003). As emphasized by Edelstein and Kilian (2009) and Barsky
and Kilian (2004), there is some evidence that an important channel for the
effect of the oil price on output is through aggregate demand and, specifically,
consumer spending. Several New Keynesian models have taken this approach
by combining a rolre for oil in firm or household demand with price rigidities
and fluctuations in the oil price, e.g. Blanchard and Riggi (2013) or Kilian and
Vigfusson (2014).
A second strand of the literature tends to use a more reduced-form
approach to investigate the reaction of consumer spending on energy-related
and other items in response to oil-price shocks. For example, there are many
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estimates of gasoline demand elasticity in the 1970s and 1980s (see Brons et al.
(2008) for a meta-analysis of such studies). More recently, Schmalensee and
Stoker (1999) employ semi-parametric methods to estimate gasoline consump-
tion as a function of household characteristics, whereas Edelstein and Kilian
(2009) and Hughes et al. (2008) infer the price elasticity of oil demand from
aggregate data. Bento et al. (2009) examine the effect of gasoline taxes on
vehicle purchase decisions in a dynamic discrete choice model.
This paper adds to the literature by including the direct effect of oil price
shocks on household welfare in a dynamic setting. Additionally, it takes into ac-
count household heterogeneity in gasoline usage. Finally, because of the welfare
considerations, it focuses not on households’ absolute gasoline consumption,
but rather on the share of gasoline expenditures on total expenditures.
3.2 Household data
In this section I use data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CEX) to investigate how gasoline consumption varies with household income.
Throughout this section the main focus is going to be on the “gasoline budget”,
i.e. gasoline expenditures as a share of total household expenditures or of
household income in the given period. This means in particular that I do not
refer to absolute levels of gasoline consumption unless mentioned explicitly.
The main result is that gasoline consumption on the intensive margin is
negatively related to income. This is in contrast to the unconditional household
gasoline budget which is a hump-shaped function of income. However, the
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increase in the gasoline budget at low income levels is driven entirely by the
extensive consumption margin, i.e. the decreasing likelihood that households
consume zero gasoline: Restricting the sample to households with positive
gasoline usage, or households owning a positive number of automobiles yields a
negative relationship between income and gasoline budget. I then focus on this
intensive-margin relationship between income and gasoline consumption and
estimate its linear regression coefficient on the set of households that choose
positive gasoline consumption.
There are two main reason why in the structural model below I focus on
the gasoline-using households (the “intensive-margin” households). The first is
that this abstracts from two discrete margins and simplifies the analysis: Not
owning a car is well predicted by low household income and non-employment.
This suggests that households are constrained by both their discrete employment
status and the non-divisibility of cars. Second, and relatedly, while gas prices
may well influence the households discrete decision of owning a car (and hence
may affect non-owners’ welfare), this channel is hard to identify in the CEX
given that car purchase decisions are relatively rare and the dataset’s panel
dimension is relatively short.
3.2.1 Dataset
The CEX is a rotating panel of households in which households remain
up to 4 consecutive quarters. In any given quarter, there are observations
for around 6, 800 households, and in this analysis I use the publicly available
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part of the dataset ranging from 1999 to 20131. The interview data contains
information on quarterly expenditures in a large number of categories, of which
the main item of interest is expenditures for “Gasoline and Motor Oil”. The
CEX also contains data for the household’s annual income before and after
taxes as well as its income rank (among the set of CEX households). The
income data is collected only in the first and in the fourth interview, such that
for the second and third interview the income data from the first interview is
used. There is a considerable number of missing values (around 27%) for the
income data.
I construct a measure for gasoline usage (the “gas budget”) by dividing
quarterly gasoline expenditures by the households total quarterly expenditures,
which will be used as the main dependent variable below. Information on
household income is mainly used as an independent variable, although I also
consider the total expenditures as a proxy for income as a regressor because
of the aforementioned concerns about the availability of the income data.
Because of the limited number of observations per household along the time
dimension, I pool all observations. Identification hence overwhelmingly comes
from cross-sectional income differences.
3.2.2 Summary statistics and distribution of gasoline consumption
Figure 3.1 displays density plots of gasoline consumption. Most notably
is the mass of observations for which households did not have any gasoline
1Data available at http://www.bls.gov/cex/pumdhome.htm
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expenditures in the previous quarter. Out of all 446, 114 household-quarter
observations, zero gasoline expenditures are reported in 46, 813 cases or 10.4%
of observations.
Figure 3.2 then excludes the 0 observations and replots both gasoline
budgets as well as their log-transforms. Somewhat interestingly, not only is
gasoline consumption in gallons considerably right-skewed, so are the shares of
income and total expenditures spent on gasoline. The log transforms of the
budget shares are distributed more symmetrically.
This can also be observed in table 3.1 which lists conditional and
unconditional summary statistics for the two gasoline budgets: For the log-
transformed gasoline budgets, mean and median are very close.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics for gasoline consumption
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Median
Consumption, in Gal 446,114 202.3 195.6 157.3
” (positive usage) 399,301 226.0 193.4 177.2
Expenditure budget, in pct 446,025 5.0 4.6 4.0
” (positive usage) 399,281 5.6 4.5 4.4
” (log-transformed) 399,281 −3.2 0.8 −3.1
Income budget, in pct 324,902 6.5 11.0 3.4
” (positive usage) 291,268 7.3 11.4 3.9
” (log-transformed) 291,268 −3.2 1.0 −3.2
3.2.3 Conditional nonparametric bivariate relationships
In this subsection I display the (bivariate) relationship of the gasoline
budget with household income and a few other variables. As mentioned in
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of gasoline consumption and expenditures
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Figure 3.2: Distribution conditional on positive usage
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the data section 3.2.1 in the analysis I mainly focus on gas expenditures as
a share of total expenditures rather than as a share of income because total
expenditures are observed every quarter and income only annually. Additionally
it allows us to directly focus on how the household splits up its consumption
basket between gasoline and other items.2
Figure 3.3 displays a nonparametric relationship between the gasoline
budget along the y-axis and income quantile and total expenditures, respectively,
along the x-axes. Most notable is the graphs’ hump shape: For low levels of
income, the conditional expectation of gas expenditures increases with income.
For incomes higher than approximately median or more than around $8, 000 of
quarterly expenditures, the relationship reverses such that further increasing
the income level predicts a lower gasoline budget.
The initial increase in the gas budget for low income levels appears
to be driven entirely by the extensive margin, i.e. households that do not
to buy any gasoline. Excluding such households, as is done in figure 3.4,
leads to a consistently negative relationship in the nonparametric estimation.
This is because, as one may expect, non-usage is heavily concentrated among
low-income households.
That the incidence of no gasoline expenditures is located in the left
tail of the income distribution also becomes evident if one considers several
subsamples with higher rates of positive gasoline usage, as is done in figure
2This can reduce bias if households’ consumption expenditures on gas and all other items
are less volatile over time than their incomes.
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Figure 3.3: Gas budget as function of income / total expenditures
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Figure 3.4: Gas budget conditional on positive usage
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3.5. The figure displays the relationship conditional on properties like being of
working age, having a positive number of workweeks over the past year, and
owning a car, all of which are correlated with gasoline usage. These conditions
strongly change the predicted gasoline budget for the lower three income deciles,
but little in the right part of the income distribution.
3.2.4 Regression
Focusing on the intensive margin of gasoline usage, I then estimate
regression coefficients on the set of observations with strictly positive gasoline
expenditures. I consider a number of specifications where income is proxied by
income rank, annual income, or total quarterly expenditures, respectively, and
where gasoline consumption is measured as the absolute expenditure budget,
or its log transform. A number of demographic regressors and a time trend are
also included.
Table 3.2 collects these OLS regression results. The controls not shown
are a quarterly time dummy, a region dummy (Midwest, Northeast, South,
West), a categorical variable for size of the metropolitan area, gender, race, age
and education of the reference person, as well as marital status and family size.
For all measures of income and gas budget the relationship after con-
trolling for the demographic characteristics is negative. The first three columns
express the effect on the gas budget in absolute terms: For example, as listed
in column 1, moving up one decile in the income distribution decreases the
gas budget by 0.25 percentage points. Columns (4) and (5) contain the gas
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Figure 3.5: Gas budget as function of income / total expenditures
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
02
5
0.
03
5
0.
04
5
0.
05
5
Gas budget (all Hh)
Income quantile
G
as
ol
in
e 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 b
u
dg
et
All
Age 25−60
Working
Own car
Gas > 0
Nonparametric estimation of expected gas budget conditional on income quantile for several
subsamples. “All”: full sample (as in figure 3.3, “Age 25-60”: reference person is in that age
range, “Working”: reference person worked at least 1 week in the previous year, “Own car”:
own at least 1 automobile, “Gas ¿ 0”: positive gas usage (as in figure 3.4).
96
budget’s log transform as dependent variable, so that one decile increase in the
income rank is associated with a 4.27% reduction in the gas budget.
3.3 Model
3.3.1 Households
Households purchase gasoline for two purposes: they buy a fixed amount
E¯ every period in order to commute to work, and a quantity EHit from which
they derive utility, for example in the form of going on joyrides or driving a
car with higher gas usage. A household i’s total gas purchases (in gallons) in
period t are therefore E¯ + EHit . The oil price qt evolves exogenously according
to an autoregressive process given by
log qt = (1− ρq) log q˜ + ρq log qt−1 + εqt .
The parameter q˜ defines the steady-state level of the gasoline price.
Households are indexed by their type i. Each type i has a weight ωi and
the total mass is normalized to 1. Household types differ in their labor efficiency:
One hour of labor supplied by household i yields ei units of labor services to a
firm. Denoting labor supply (in hours) by LHit , effective labor services provided
by the household are eiL
H
it . There is a common labor market for all households
in which one unit of labor service is paid a wage wt. Households have to pay a
tax at rate τL on their labor income and receive profits pit from firms. Since
there is no saving, the flow budget constraint is
(
1− τL)wteitLHt + pit = Cit + qtEHit + qtE¯ (3.1)
97
T
ab
le
3.
2:
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
re
su
lt
s
D
ep
en
de
n
t
va
ri
ab
le
:
E
x
p
en
d
it
u
re
S
h
ar
e
lo
g(
E
x
p
en
d
it
u
re
S
h
ar
e)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
In
co
m
e
R
an
k
−0
.0
25
3∗
∗∗
−0
.4
27
1∗
∗∗
(0
.0
00
3)
(0
.0
06
0)
lo
g(
In
co
m
e)
−0
.0
04
5∗
∗∗
(0
.0
00
1)
lo
g(
E
x
p
en
d
it
u
re
s)
−0
.0
24
4∗
∗∗
−0
.5
16
1∗
∗∗
(0
.0
00
1)
(0
.0
01
9)
C
on
st
an
t
0.
06
81
∗∗
∗
0.
10
11
∗∗
∗
0.
26
38
∗∗
∗
−3
.0
48
3∗
∗∗
1.
14
67
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
01
9)
(0
.0
02
0)
(0
.0
01
8)
(0
.0
34
1)
(0
.0
31
6)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
28
1,
16
7
29
8,
54
9
39
8,
13
9
28
1,
16
7
39
8,
13
9
R
2
0.
17
22
0.
16
40
0.
23
08
0.
18
75
0.
28
72
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
n
o
t
sh
ow
n
in
cl
u
d
ed
in
a
ll
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s:
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
ti
m
e
eff
ec
ts
,
re
g
io
n
,
m
et
ro
p
o
li
ta
n
a
re
a
,
ge
n
d
er
,
ra
ce
,
ag
e,
ed
u
ca
ti
on
,
m
a
ri
ta
l
st
a
tu
s
a
n
d
fa
m
il
y
si
ze
.
98
where Cit is consumption of the output good which serves as the economy’s
numeraire.
Lifetime utility is given by
max
Ct,Et,Lt
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
{
log
(
ϕC
ζ−1
ζ
t + (1− ϕ)
(
EHt
) ζ−1
ζ
) ζ
ζ−1
− ψ
(
LHt
)1+ν
1 + ν
}]
subject to the sequence of budget constraints (3.1). This utility function
specifies that households have a constant elasticity of substitution between
consumption of the output good and gasoline consumption. The first-order
conditions are
EHit =
(
1− ϕ
ϕ
1
qt
)ζ
Cit
Cit =
(
1− τL)wteit
ψ
(
1 +
(
1−ϕ
ϕ
)ζ
q1−ζt
)
(LHit )
ν
.
3.3.2 Firms
The economy’s production side is very simple: A representative firms
produces output goods Yt according to
Yt =
(
ALt Lt
)α
where ALt is exogenously evolving labor productivity (which like the oil price
will be specified as an AR-1 process), and Lt is total labor services employed
by the firm.
The firm maximizes
max
Lt
(
ALt Lt
)α − wtLt
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such that the optimality condition requires α
(
ALt
)α
Lα−1t = wt.
3.3.3 Market clearing and equilibrium
There are only 2 markets in the economy: The market for labor and
the market for final goods. The market for oil does not clear inside the model,
instead there is an infinite supply of oil at the exogenous price qt (an alternative
way to think about this is that households “mine” oil at a constant cost of qt
in their backyards).
The market clearing for final goods is the economy’s resource constraint
Yt − qt
(
E¯ +
∑
i
ωiE
HH
it
)
=
∑
i
ωiCit,
and labor market clearing requires that the household’s labor supply in efficiency
units corresponds to the firm’s labor demand
Lt =
∑
i
ωiL
H
it .
An equilibrium consists of plans for the endogenous quantities
{
Cit, E
H
it ,
Lsit, Lt
}
, the market clearing real wage {wt}, fixed processes for the exogenous
state variables
{
ALt , qt
}
such that optimality and market clearing conditions
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are satisfied. This is summarized by the system of equations
wt = α
(
ALt
)α
Lα−1t
qζt =
(
1− ϕ
ϕ
)ζ
Cit
EHit
ψ
(
1 + ϕζ (1− ϕ)ζ q1−ζt
) (
LHit
)ν
Cit =
(
1− τL)wteit(
1− τL)wteitLHit + ωi ((ALt Lt)α − wtLt) = Cit + qtEHit + qtE¯
Lt =
∑
i
eitωiL
H
it ,
and the exogenous block
logALt = ρL logA
L
t−1 + ε
L
t
log qt = (1− ρq) log q˜ + ρq log qt−1 + εqt .
3.3.4 Calibration and results
Calibration
To analyze how welfare effects of oil price shocks vary with income I
split the household sector in two groups: “rich” and “poor” households with
equal mass ωr = ωp = 0.5. I calibrate their respective labor efficiencies to
match the relative total consumption expenditures observed in the data and
setting mean labor efficiency to 1. Since in the CEX households in the top
half of the income distribution have mean quarterly expenditures that are a
bit more than twice as high as the expenditures of households in the bottom
half ($15, 800 vs. $7, 300) which implies values of approximately er = 1.37 and
ep = 0.63. Table 3.3 collects these and all other parameter values.
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Several parameters are set to standard values. The elasticity of pro-
duction with respect to labor is α = 2/3. Households discount the future at
a quarterly rate of β = 0.99 and have a Frisch elasticity of labor supply of
1/ν = 2. The households’ utility coefficient on labor is normalized to φ = 1.
The labor efficiency process has a persistence of ρL = 0.9 and the standard
deviation of its innovation εL = 0.012 is set to match the long-run variance of
detrended US GDP of 1.7%.
The labor tax rate τL = 0.2 roughly targets total receipts of income tax
and payroll tax in the US as a share of total labor income. For the exogenous
process describing the gas price, running an AR-1 estimation on quarterly
retail gasoline prices from 1976Q1 to 2014Q4 yields a persistence parameter of
ρq = 0.95 and a residual standard deviation of ε
q
t = 0.086.
This leaves the four parameters q˜, E¯, ζ and ϕ governing the household’s
gasoline consumption. Of these, both the steady state gas price q˜ and the
preference weight ϕ determine the steady-state level of the gas expenditure
budget and are not separately identified. I therefore normalize the long-run gas
price q˜ to 1. I rely on Kehrig and Ziebarth (2009) who find that consumption
and oil usage enter as complements in household preferences to set the elasticity
of substitution ζ = 0.73. Finally I calibrate the two remaining parameters
ϕ = 0.961 and E¯ = 0.02 to match the mean gas budget (as share of total
expenditures) for the top and bottom half of the income distribution in the CEX,
in which the observed expenditure budgets are 4.85% and 6.21%, respectively.
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Result
I simulate the economy up to a first-order approximation around its
non-stochastic steady state. Figure 3.6 displays the impulse response functions
in percentage deviations from steady state after a significant gas price shock
of 50%, which corresponds approximately to an increase of the gasoline price
from $2 to $3 per gallon. Since in the model oil has no role in the production
function, there is a small positive impact on output because households partially
compensate the reduction in their budget set by working longer hours. Total
gas usage decreases for both households, but more so in relative terms for the
rich since the fixed part E¯ constitutes a smaller share of their gasoline budget.
Conversely, the relatively large share of E¯ in the poor household’s income
means that the poor type has to reduce their consumption Cp to a relatively
larger extent.
To evaluate the welfare loss for the households quantitatively one can run
a counterfactual experiment in which, instead of the one-time oil price shock,
steady-state labor taxes are raised by an amount that makes the household
indifferent between the higher tax rate and the oil price shock. The rich type
suffers a welfare loss equivalent to a steady-state tax increase of 0.01 percentage
points with an oil price shock of 1%, while the poor type suffers a loss equivalent
to a tax hike of 0.019 percentage points. In the example this means that, in
order to avoid an increase in the gas price from $2 to $3, rich households would
tolerate a tax increase from 20% to 20.5%, and poor households from 20% to
20.95%, even though households know that in the long run the gasoline price
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Figure 3.6: IRF to gas price shock
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Table 3.4: Permanent labor tax hike equivalent with one-time 50% oil price
shock
Household type Equivalent tax increase
High-income 0.5% (from 20% to 20.5%)
Low-income 0.95% (from 20% to 20.95%)
returns to its steady-state value.
3.4 Summary and future work
The model of household gasoline consumption outlined above mirrors
the empirical finding that high-income households allocate a lower share of their
budget to gasoline consumption. Calibrated to the CEX data on household
income and expenditures, the model predicts that oil price shocks have direct
effects on welfare that are almost twice as large for households in the lower
half of the income distribution as for those in the upper half. For example,
a one-time increase in the gas price from $2 to $3 would be equivalent with
a permanent tax increase of 0.5% for high-income households but equivalent
with a 0.95% tax hike for low-income households.
There are several possible ways for further research. First, this paper
currently does not take advantage of the time dimension in the dataset. On
an aggregate level one could exploit the fluctuation in the oil price over time,
whereas on the household level one could make use of the (albeit short) panel
dimension to better control for household heterogeneity. Second, while the
model has focused on the direct effects of the oil price on household welfare
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through the gas price, one could follow the large literature that considers a role
for oil in production, and include indirect effects through labor demand. These
indirect effects could potentially have further significant distributional impacts.
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Appendix 1
1.1 Aggregator’s demand function
The aggregator’s problem is to
max
{yi}1i=0
[∫
b
1
σ
i y
σ−1
σ
i di
] σ
σ−1
+ λ
[
I −
∫
piyidi
]
+
∫
µi [y¯ − yi] di
such that the first-order necessary conditions with respect to yi are given by[∫
b
1
σ
i y
σ−1
σ
i di
] 1
σ−1
(
bi
yi
) 1
σ
= λpi + µiyi ∀i.
For any given variety i either we have to consider two cases. If the aggregator
is unconstrained in this variety, i.e. µi = 0, then
λ =
[∫
b
1
σ
i y
σ−1
σ
i di
] 1
σ−1
(bj/yj)
1
σ ,
whereas the aggregator is limited to purchasing y¯ of variety i if
µi =
[∫
b
1
σ
i y
σ−1
σ
i di
] 1
σ−1
(
bi
yi
) 1
σ
− λpi > 0
.
For any two varieties i, j with µi = µj = 0 then the relationship
yi
yj
=
bi
bj
(
pj
pi
)σ
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holds. Integrating over all i one then has
I =
∫ 1
0
piyidi =
(∫
i∈U
p1−σi bidi
)
yj
bj
pσj +
∫
i∈C
piy¯di
= P 1−σU yj
pσj
bj
+
∫
i∈C
piy¯,
where U ≡ {i : µi = 0} and C ≡ {i : µi > 0} are index sets over unconstrained
and constrained varieties, respectively, and PU ≡
(∫
i∈U p
1−σ
i bidi
) 1
1−σ is a price
index over unconstrained varities.
Demand for an unconstrained variety j is then given by
yj = bj
(
I − ∫
i∈C piy¯di
)
P σ−1U
pσj
= bj
IUP
σ−1
U
pσj
,
where IU ≡ I −
∫
i∈C piy¯di are the aggregator’s expenses over unconstrained
varieties.
1.2 Equilibrium conditions
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First-order conditions for pi and ki:
ES
[
ξ
(
Πppit − 1
)
Πppit + y
s
t rpt (σ − 1)
∫ b¯t
0
b
b¯t
df (b)
]
= ES
[
yst rpt
{
1− F (b¯t)+ σ ∫ b¯t
0
(
b
b¯t
) ψ
α+ψ(1−α)
df (b)
}
+
ξ
(
Πppit+1 − 1
)
Πppit+1
]
Rt − (1− δ) = ES
[
α (ψ − 1)
ψ
rpt
yst
kt
×{[
1− F (b¯t)]+ ∫ b¯t
0
(
b
b¯t
) ψ
α+ψ(1−α)
df (b)
}]
Firm supply ys:
yst =
(
α
χ
) 1
ψ−1
(
1− α
wt
)ψ(1−α)
α(ψ−1)
rp
α+ψ(1−α)
α(ψ−1)
t kt
Aggregate supply and factor demands from firms:
Yt = b¯
1
σ−1
t y
s
t
{[∫ b¯t
0
b
b¯t
df (b) +
∫ ∞
b¯t
(
b
b¯t
) 1
σ
df (b)
]} σ
σ−1
Ldt =
1− α
wt
rpty
s
t
(∫ b¯t
0
(
b
b¯t
) ψ
α+ψ(1−α)
df (b) +
[
1− F (b¯t)])
CUt =
α
ψ
rpty
s
t
(∫ b¯t
0
(
b
b¯t
) ψ
α+ψ(1−α)
df (b) +
[
1− F (b¯t)])
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Household optimality conditions (Euler equation, no-arbitrage, labor supply):
1
Ct
= βRtE
[
1
Ct+1Πt+1
]
RtE
[
1
Ct+1Πt+1
]
= E
[
Rt
Ct+1
]
wt = ϕtL
ε
tC
τ
t
Definition of producer price inflation:
Πppit = Πt
rpt
rpt−1
Market clearing conditions:
kt = Kt
Ldt = Lt
Taylor rule:
log (Rt) = log (1/β) + CBrf log (Πt)
Aggregate resource constraint:
Yt = Ct + CUt +
ξ
2
(
Πppit − 1
)2
+ [Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt] +Gt
Aggregator’s zero-profit condition It = PtYt:
Yt = rpty
s
t
(∫ b¯t
0
bdf(b)
b¯t
+
[
1− F (b¯t)])
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1.3 Variance of firm profitability
A firm’s profitability is given as
piSRi =
piyi
kαi l
1−α
i
= pi
(
k˜i
k
)α
=
p2i
P
(
min
{
bi, b¯
}
b¯
) α
2−α (
α
2
1
χ
)α(
1− α
w
)1−α
.
Since all firms set the same price pi = p, it follows for the variance of log
profitability
Var (log(piSRi)) = Var
(
α
2− α log
(
min
{
bi, b¯
})
+
log
[(
1
b¯
) α
2−α p2
P
(
α
2
1
χ
)α(
1− α
w
)1−α])
=
(
α
2− α
)2
Var
(
log
(
min
{
bi, b¯
}))
.
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Appendix 2
2.1 Derivation of the firm-specific bond price
As mentioned in section 2.2.4 firm revenue net of wages is given by
pi (z, k,Σ) =
1− α + ασ
σ
{[
(σ − 1) (1− α)
σw
](σ−1)(1−α)
(Azkα)σ−1 Y
} 1
1−α+ασ
C (w)
[
(Azkα)σ−1 Y
] 1
1−α+ασ .
Then the firm’s assets after production in any period are pi (z, k, A) + (1− δ) k
whereas its liabilities consist of debt b carried over from last period (although
b could theoretically be negative if the firm decided to save). Consequently net
worth is n = pi (z, k, A) + (1− δ) k − b. The assumption behind the friction is
that for exogenous institutional reasons there is a lower bound of net worth n¯
which is not enforceable for repayment — so if the firm’s net worth would fall
below n¯ it partially or fully defaults instead.
Given capital, debt and aggregate state this implies a cutoff z¯ for
the level of idiosyncratic productivity that triggers default, implied by n¯ =
(1− δ) k′ + C (w) [(Az¯kα)σ−1 Y ] 11−α+ασ − b. Solving for z¯ one has
z¯ =
(
n¯+ b− (1− δ) k′
C (w)
) 1−α+ασ
σ−1
(Akα)−1 Y −
1
σ−1 .
The autoregressive nature of z in turn determines a cutoff value ¯ for the
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lognormally distributed shock  given as
ρz log z−1 + log ¯ ≡ log z¯
¯ = elog z¯−ρz log z−1 ,
determining the likelihood of default.
The second piece of information needed to determine the risk premium
is the fraction of the loan that is recoverable in case of default (i.e. the recovery
rate). In default, the lender can claim all but the minimum level n¯ of the
borrower’s assets so that the actual repayment b¯ is defined as
b¯ (z, k,Σ) ≡ max
{
(1− δ) k + C (w) [(Azkα)σ−1 Y ] 11−α+ασ − n¯, 0} .
Repayments are bounded below by zero. This matters only for the rare case of
total default, i.e. a realization of z which is so low that (1− δ) k+pi (z, k, A) < n¯.
This inequality implies a second cutoff value defining the threshold for total
default
 =
(
n¯− (1− δ) k
C (w)
) 1−α+ασ
σ−1
[Azρzkα]−1 Y −
1
σ−1 .
There is a default cost χb amounting to a fraction χ of the original loan. So
the recovery rate R˜ (z, k, b,Σ) can be defined as
R˜ (z, k, b,Σ) ≡ b¯ (z, k)
b
− χ.
The price of the bond, then, makes the lender indifferent between lending
to a firm that chooses k’ and b’ and is in state z today, and lending at the
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risk-free interest rate R.
q (z, k′, b′,Σ) =
1
R
EA
[
1 +
∫
′<¯
R˜ (z′ (′) , (1− δ) k′, b′,Σ)− 1dF (′)
]
=
1
R
EA
[
1− F (¯) (1 + χ)
+
∫
<′<¯
(1− δ) k′ + C (w′) [(A′z′k′α)σ−1 Y ′] 11−α+ασ − n¯
b′
dF (′)
]
=
1
R
EA
[
1− F (¯) (1 + χ) + [F (¯)− F ()]
[
(1− δ) k − n¯
b′
]
+ z
ρz(σ−1)
1−α+ασ
C (w′)
[
(A′k′α)σ−1 Y ′
] 1
1−α+ασ
b′
∫
<′<¯
′
σ−1
1−α+ασdF (′)
]
,
from which equation (2.3) follows with ν ≡  σ−11−α+ασ and ν¯ and ν defined
correspondingly.
2.2 Outline of numerical model solution
Using Khan and Thomas (2008)’s approach of normalizing the price
of output with the household’s marginal utility of consumption define P ≡
u′ (C). With the household’s discount factor given as d(Σ′,Σ) ≡ βu′ (C ′) /u′ (C)
equations (2.4)-(2.6) can be rewritten as
v (z, k, b,Σ) = max
1adj
1adj [va (z,−φ+ n˜,Σ)] + (1− 1adj) vn (z, k, b,Σ) , (2.1)
va (z, n˜,Σ) = max
k′,b′
P [n˜+ q (z, k′, b′,Σ) b′ − k′ − φ] + γβEΣ [v (z′, k′, b′,Σ′)] ,
(2.2)
vn (z, k, b,Σ) = max
b′
P [n˜+ q (z, k, b′,Σ) b′ − k] + γβEΣ [v (z′, k, b′,Σ′)] . (2.3)
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As outlined in section 2.4.1, the distribution µ is approximated using
a grid over values for aggregate capital K. The algorithm then proceeds as
follows:
1. Guess an initial set of log-linear functions K ′(A,K), C(A,K), Y (A,K)
and w(A,K) which can be represented by their coefficients. Agents use
these functions to forecast aggregate variables given the aggregate state.
2. Given the approximating functions the remaining aggregate variables
P (A,K) and R(A,K) can be computed as functions of the aggregate
state.
3. Derive the firms’ value functions (2.1)-(2.3) and associated policy func-
tions by value function iteration.
4. Simulate the economy for a large number of periods using the firms’ policy
functions. To this purpose a sequence of aggregate TFP A is drawn at
random for the first simulation and held constant throughout all following
iterations. The discretized steady state distribution is simulated forward
using the policy functions for next period’s endogenous state variables
k′ and b′ and the stochastic transition rule for z′. The first few hundred
periods are being discarded, and the aggregate variables of the remaining
simulated periods are stored.
5. Regress the stored values for K ′, C, Y and w from the simulation onto
A and K to obtain new estimates for the coefficients of the log-linear
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relationships from 1. If the new estimates and the previously used
coefficients are close, stop. Otherwise update the coefficients by using
a convex combination of the previous ones and the new estimates, and
return to 2.
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